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Destabilizing Animation: Structures of Agency and Uncanny Animacy in Animated Media 
 
Cole Armitage  
 
This thesis examines the destabilization of a hierarchical ordering of human vs. nonhuman 
agency found in digital media which present a surge of “animacy” – perceptible qualities of 
“agency, awareness, mobility and liveness” (Chen 2012). It examines one webtoon (The 
Bongcheon-Dong Ghost 2011) and two video games (Undertale 2015 and Doki Doki Literature 
Club 2017), which push at the boundaries of their respective media forms by channeling 
technical/computational forces (e.g. Javascript or memory storage) into character animation; 
“animation” in a doubled sense: both as the fusion of discontinuous instants afforded by the 
mechanical succession of images as well as the production of a social Other possessing qualities 
of life and agency (Silvio 2019). The result is a perception of agency (and thus animacy) that 
resists the categorization of both the character and the media object. Challenging dominant 
structures and theories of comic readership, video game play, or “database consumption” (Azuma 
2009) respectively, these works argue against the control that the human operator is presumed 
both to have and to require as part of a framework which constitutes the works themselves as 
media objects. This thesis further argues that the structures critiqued and challenged by these 
works index a broader conceptualization of human action in the world, predicated on “animacy 
hierarchies” which are buttressed by binaries of human/nonhuman, animate/inanimate, 
moving/still, subject/object, and will/determination. By adopting an animist logic, in which 
images/media/characters might potentially act in unforeseen ways, these works challenge and 
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Halfway through the battle with Providence, the final boss of the Japanese Role-Playing 
Game Bravely Second: End Layer (Square Enix, 2015), the godlike and monstrous being 
cryptically alludes to the possibility that its quartet of playable characters are not in control of 
their fate: that they are being observed, monitored, and even controlled. Perhaps, I think as I 
challenge the boss, it refers to some grand architect behind the events of the drama I have 
watched unfold over the 40+ hour narrative. But then, as it carries on with its villainous 
monologue, the camera angle shifts so that its giant singular eyeball can look directly at the entity 
it refers to. It looks at me, the player. It notes that the one that really has agency, the one that the 
characters of the game must really defeat in order to survive, is me. The screen goes white, and 
the game exits to the title menu. Confused, I attempt to reload my save file, to select ‘Continue’, 
but each press of a button, no matter which button it is, moves my cursor closer towards only one 
option: to delete my save file. Providence is right; this is the way to really take the control I have 
away.  
And yet, the Providence boss fight was not even the first time I played through an event 
involving a similar shattering of the fourth-wall in a game. The year before Bravely Second: End 
Layer released in North America, the massive indie-game hit Undertale (Toby Fox, 2015) had 
released, and in it, the character Flowey likewise refutes my agency as a player by outright 
erasing my save file and taking it over as his own. Two years later I continue to see a similar 
series of events play out with Doki Doki Literature Club’s (Team Salvato, 2017) character 
Monika, who begins reshaping the game to her will as she refutes my agency as a player. More 
than ever, video games seem to be asking me to think about the relationship that I have with them 
and their characters as a player, to ask myself if there are better ways to exist in relation to them. 
But perhaps more importantly, those games always seem to make this argument by coming to 
life: Providence can actually see me, Flowey seems to sense my presence, and Monika asks me if 
I can hear her. And though I begin this discussion with video games, many other examples of 
interactive media seem to be springing to life to take control out of my hands and declare their 
own lives – as real, yet nonetheless fictional, nonhuman agents.  
  What do these acts of conjuring a sense of fictional characters, and the media they inhabit, 
as truly alive, these acts of animation, actually do? Is there more to them than their mere surprise 
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value? Do they have anything to say beyond a simple trick? What value is there in asking me to 
treat a fictional god, or a flower, or a girl, as something other than an object that exists to be 
manipulated by myself as a human agent? Perhaps the answer is that of an imminent critique of 
certain structures, structures that more broadly characterize my way of being in the world, 
structures that are not unique to video games and other interactive media but just so happen to 
extend to them as well. Perhaps in addition to being about the way I view characters in games as 
chess pieces, or monsters in games as resources to be collected, they are about my failure to 
recognize and anticipate nonhuman agency more broadly. Perhaps by changing the way I play, or 
view, or read, these works want me to rethink my relationship to nonhumans, to the world at 
large, in different terms.  
The objective of this thesis is to understand these moments of “coming to life” and to 
develop an analytical framework that accounts for them and their disruption of human agency. I 
explore this through the use of three examples, each of which come to occupy their own chapters: 
one Korean webtoon, The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost (Horang, 2011), and two North American 
produced Japanese-style video games, Undertale and Doki Doki Literature Club. I characterize 
these “coming to life” moments as “animation”, both because they at times are (or contain) 
animation, but also because they themselves as media “come to life.” Moreover, each example is 
selected not merely because they demonstrate the agency of particular nonhumans but because 
those demonstrations allow for the transformation of general concepts derived from certain 
theories of media: in comic theory, game theory, and character theory respectively. In other 
words, they inject a sense of animacy not only into a particular piece of media but also into the 
theorization of certain media forms more broadly. Each subverts the expectations of their human 
operator, and the way that that operator positions themselves in relation to the media object. At 
the same time, they argue that they, as media objects, can do more than they might otherwise be 
theorized to be capable of.  Thus, this thesis centers the mediality of each object, such as 
Javascript triggers, memory, and data reading. The media that I examine channel these 
computational forces into the experience of characters. In doing so, they not only achieve an 
uncanny animacy, but do so in a way that reveals what is already uncanny about the potentials of 
their respective media forms.  
This thesis begins by looking at how these works establish a “normal” relationship 
between human operator and media object. It considers how each example produces its sense of 
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“life,” and how the prior construction of the human participant as active, agential, and “animate” 
plays a role in that production. It then asks what framework the production of “life” in that which 
otherwise is framed as passive, available for manipulation, and “inanimate” destabilizes, and 
which binary oppositions in particular. The thesis concludes by considering what remains in the 
wake of such a destabilizing moment. At stake is the degree to which these moments of 
destabilizing life support or refute frameworks for being in the world that are inherently at odds 
with one another.  
 
Age of Animation 
In Puppets, Gods, and Brands: Theorizing the Age of Animation from Taiwan, 
anthropologist Teri Silvio claims that “We are entering an Age of Animation.”1 This is not just 
because animation is increasingly the dominant form of media that is consumed globally, from 
CGI blockbusters to video games; it is also because “our attention is increasingly turned toward 
the idea of animation.”2 Topics such as posthumanism and artificial life abound in our cultural 
consciousness. Silvio adds that animation “in the narrow sense (a kind of cinema or video),” 
(which we might expand to include forms like comics) “is popular because animation in the 
broad sense (giving objects lives of their own) is good to think with – specifically, to think 
through what is happening right now in the intersections of technology and capitalism, of the 
global and the local, of the human and the nonhuman.”3  
Silvio is not the only one to claim that thinking of animation is increasingly relevant to 
our current cultural moment; Deborah Levitt likewise contends that we are entering into an age of 
animation, what she terms “the animatic apparatus.”4 In the animatic apparatus, “the status and 
limits of life are everywhere at issue.”5 Specifically, life is increasingly imaged and reimaged 
 
1 Teri Silvio. Puppets, Gods, and Brands: Theorizing the Age of Animation from Taiwan (University of  
Hawaii Press, 2019), 3.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. Emphasis not present in original.  
4 Deborah Levitt. The Animatic Apparatus: Animation, Vitality, and the Futures of the Image. (John Hunt Publishing, 
2018.) 
5 Ibid., 3. I characterize comics as something of a fringe case with respect to the narrow definition. While the 
images of comics are not “animated” in a literal sense, they afford a sense of movement in a different way. 
Moreover, many forms of comic art employ the conventions of cinema. As Thomas Lamarre points out, manga has 
been “construed as a way of ‘doing film’ on paper.” Thomas Lamarre. "Speciesism, Part III: Neoteny and the Politics 
of Life." Mechademia 6, no. 1 (2011): 115. 
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(biometrics and new forms of bioproduction) just as images themselves are increasingly alive (as 
in artificial life, or media ecologies). At the same time as we are being asked to grapple with 
previously invisible forms of liveliness in nonhumans, we are producing more and more of it in 
both science and art.  
Theories of animation in the digital age have most heavily focused on animation “in the 
narrow sense,” as Silvio refers to it, most of which have been focused on the study of comics, 
animated film, video games, and the like.6 Some of this scholarship has focused on differentiating 
animated media from its counterpart in “live-action” media, both in terms of techne and in terms 
of philosophical disposition.7 Perhaps one of the most influential in this regard has been Thomas 
Lamarre’s The Anime Machine, and especially the typology of cinematic (into depth) and 
animetic (sliding layers) movement. Many other animation scholars, such as Azuma Hiroki and 
Ian Condry, have focused on the shifts in the production, consumption, and distribution of 
animation in the digital age.8 The globalization of animation and anime are increasingly relevant 
topics covered by scholars such as Marc Steinberg, Alexander Zahlten, and Anne Allison.9  
Part of the project of Silvio’s book is to put forth an anthropological theory of animation 
which is focused on animation “not as a specific technology but as a broader category of human, 
cultural action.”10 This is, in other words, animation “in the broad sense”. Silvio offers a 
definition of animation in this sense as:  
 
the construction of social others through the projection of qualities perceived as human— 
life, soul, power, agency, intentionality, personality, and so on—outside the self and  
into the sensory environment, through acts of creation, perception, and interaction.11 
 
 
6 Silvio. Puppets, Gods, and Brands, 7. 
7 See Alan Cholodenko. "Still Photography?." Afterimage 32, no. 5 (2005): 5. 
8 See Henry Jenkins. Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide. (New York and London; New York 
University Press: 2006), Azuma Hiroki. Otaku: Japan's Database Animals. (U of Minnesota Press, 2009), and Ian 
Condry. The Soul of Anime: Collaborative Creativity and Japan's Media Success Story. (Duke University Press, 2013) 
9 See Marc Steinberg. Anime's Media Mix: Franchising Toys and Characters in Japan. (U of  
Minnesota Press, 2012), Alexander Zahlten. "Media Mix and the Metaphoric Economy of World." In The Oxford 
Handbook of Japanese Cinema. Edited by Daisuke Miyao. (Oxford University Press, 2014),and Anne 
Allison. Millennial Monsters: Japanese Toys and the Global Imagination. Vol. 13. (Univ of California Press, 2006). 
10 Ibid. 4.  
11 Ibid. 19.  
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What constitutes animation according to this definition is, for Silvio, dependent on projection and 
perception, and thus begins and ends at the (presumably human) self; I will return to this. It is 
also culturally specific: it “can be considered animation only if the object onto which [qualities 
perceived as human are] projected is culturally defined as not having those qualities.”12 This 
projection isn’t necessarily a matter of religion and belief; both perceiving “a rock as ‘alive” as 
well as “ventriloquizing what you think your cat is thinking/saying” are equally acts of 
animation. Other examples of Silvio’s anthropological definition tracking outside of the “overtly 
religious sphere” include, for example, “Marx’s theory of the commodity fetish.”13 This moves 
Silvio’s focus from a set of technologies to a general investment of agency: “icons, effigies, 
talismans, fetishes, and natural objects.”14 What is useful about this definition for this project is 
the set of qualities Silvio isolates, particularly in that it foregrounds a link between animation and 
agency, rather than movement. A central question this thesis asks is: under what conditions does 
one perceive agency with regard to animation? Where this thesis diverges from Silvio’s 
definition, however, is that it foregrounds the materiality of animation-as-agency, emphasizing 
things such as the transfer and processing of data; the media objects I analyze, and my 
theorization of them, acts as an explicit challenge to animation as originating from the human in 
something like an act of projection. 
Generally, when one looks to the objects of animation in the narrow sense (films, comics, 
games, and so on), it is with an emphasis on their content: anthropomorphized animals, toys that 
come to life, or cyborgs and androids. That is, it is far less often that one considers the investment 
of media with agency in terms of its interaction with an operator: comics, games, or films, that 
are treated or perceived as having greater agency than another object of their same category. One 
less often claims that the media object itself feels more alive, that one comic or one video game 
feels more alive than the objects of its category, the way that the haunted video tape in Ringu 
(1998) feels more alive than any normal video tape.15 Yet though they are neither fictional nor 
haunted objects (at least not in the most literal sense; the object of the first chapter does in fact 
present itself as haunted), that is precisely what I claim with the objects of this thesis, that The 
Bongcheon-Dong Ghost is more “alive” than most other webtoons, or that Doki Doki Literature 
 
12 Ibid. 19. 
13 Silvio, Puppets, Gods, and Brands. 37. 
14 Ibid., 36. 
15 Nakata, Hideo, dir. Ringu. 1998; California, United States: DreamWorks. DVD. 
 6 
Club is more “alive” than most video games. Thus, though the end result is a perception of 
agency, that agency is not generated through the act of projection but rather the way that the 
object itself channels technical or computational forces to produce a sense of life and agency. 
One then needs a framework that can measure such a material difference, and thus here I turn to 
“animacy.”  
 
Animacy and Agency 
This project requires a framework for a sense of “life” that is able to work within 
contemporary animated forms (i.e. the mechanical succession of images) without limiting “life” 
to movement forms. Perhaps the framework of “vitality” is a sensible alternative, but it is also 
one which may still carry a bias towards organic forms. My preference then is for “animacy,” 
particularly as employed by Mel Y. Chen in Animacies (2012). Animacy is defined by Chen as “a 
quality of agency, awareness, mobility and liveness.”16 Animacy thus encompasses, but is not 
limited to, movement as its primary vector, it is “much more than the state of being animate.”17 
Animacy is, in sum, the degree to which any object feels like an “animate” subject. One might 
imagine that, according to certain ontologies, a rock has an infinitesimally small degree of 
animacy, whereas a plant might be characterized as having a slightly higher degree. Though they 
are non-organic, automata might be characterized as having a higher degree of animacy than a 
plant, and yet very few things are, supposedly, perceived to have a higher degree of animacy than 
humans.   
Animacy (or vitality, or aliveness) is also best understood as emergent, as something that 
arises in relations between things. That is, animacy is not a property possessed by a particular 
category (human, animal, object) but is more focused on how any specific thing acts, or can act, 
in relation to other things. As such, animacy often becomes, like power relations, a negotiation, 
and at times a tense one. This makes animacy a more apt framework for the discussion of a 
construction of lifelikeness that is intractable from its relation to a particular type of user, reader, 
viewer, player, or animator. Daniel Stern, Levitt notes, likewise conceives of “aliveness” in 
similar terms, as an “emergent property.”18 Levitt notes that “[v]itality is conceived both as a 
 
16 Mel Y. Chen. Animacies: Biopolitics, racial mattering, and queer affect. (Duke University Press, 2012), 2.  
17 Ibid. 4.  
18 Levitt. The Animatic Apparatus, 91. 
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property of living systems and as an experience.”19 Another way to put this is in terms of what 
Levitt refers to as “vitality e/affects,” which are “produced in systems and patterns of relation.”20 
What constitutes artificial life, for instance, perhaps in contrast to “mere” artificial intelligence, is 
not an inherent property but the emergence of “the behavioural characteristics of natural living 
systems.”21 Animacy is thus a particularly suitable framework for a phenomenon in which media 
enact an emergence of the behavioural properties of the humans that interact with them, such as 
saving, reloading, rewinding, or scrolling.  
As a project interested in exploring the investment of the virtual nonhuman 
character/media assemblage with a sense of soul and vitality, this project takes some inspiration 
from the vital materialism of scholars such as Jane Bennett. Bennett famously draws from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work on assemblages and Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory in order to 
form a concept of “thing-power,” or the way that things come to possess agency by virtue of their 
patterns of relation as part of an assemblage. This project aligns more with what Bennett refers to 
as “traditional” vitalism rather than vital materialism and thing-power in two noteworthy ways, 
however. 22 First, and more superficially, it looks less at a complex web of relations and more at a 
particular and isolated engagement between the human and nonhuman, each of which can also be 
conceived of as assemblages in their own right but are more generally treated as singular actants 
here. More importantly, it evokes traditional vitalism in that it does “posit a separate force that 
can enter and animate a physical body.”23  My examples in this project do posit certain 
technical/computational forces as animating forces that are clearly distinct from the 
media/characters which it animates. It is at the very least worth making clear that this animacy or 
vitality which I refer to here is not a rejection of Bennett’s formulation, but rather works in 
tandem with it. That is, a rock, or in my case a game/character assemblage, has its own vitality 
and thing-power by virtue of its implication in an assemblage, but also has the capacity to be 
further animated by an animating force which is distinct and itself moves through different 
bodies, both human and nonhuman. We might say that the former is an “always on” vitality, and 
the latter is a “potentially on” vitality, or animacy. What is important for my purposes about 
 
19 Ibid. 90. Emphasis not present in original. 
20 Ibid. 90.  
21 Mark A. Bedau. “Artificial Life”. 2016. https://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/artl. Quoted in Russell Belk, Mariam 
Humayun, and Ahir Gopaldas. “Artifical Life”. Journal of Macromarketing. 2020, 1. Emphasis not present in original. 
22 Jane Benett. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. (Duke University Press, 2010), xiii.  
23 Ibid. 
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vitality as put forth by Bennett however is that it does not just refer to “the capacity of things… 
to impede or block the will and designs of humans” but also their capacity to “act as quasi agents 
or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own.”24 In other words, vitality is 
also about agency. 
In this project’s objects of analysis, agency and animacy become two ways of viewing 
and understanding the same phenomena. Agency here refers to the capacity for action itself, and 
animacy is the affect that is produced when that agency is demonstrated; wherever agency is 
demonstrated, animacy becomes perceptible. Chen’s definition of animacy explains why this is 
the case, as agency is one factor among others in the production of animacy. And agency, for its 
part, is theorized in similar terms to animacy, as emergent. As Betti Marenko notes, “[a]gency is 
not something that objects have. Rather, agency is something that emerges out of encounters with 
things.”25 Bennett also suggests that “actant” and “operator” might rightly substitute “for what in 
a more subject centered vocabulary are called agents.”26 If agency and animacy are nearly 
congruous, and agents and operators are likewise interchangeable, it follows, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, that struggle over the operation of an animated object is also a struggle over 
relations of animacy. Perhaps this becomes transparent in the image of a puppet fighting back 
against its operator, but it may be less obvious in terms of the operator of, for instance, a 
computer program. Silvio notes that “[w]hen we move from the study of animation as art and 
techne to the study of animation as religious practice [or more broadly as the investment of 
objects with animacy], we make a parallel move from the illusion of life to the investment and 
perception of agency.”27 Again, we might rightly substitute here the “perception of agency” for 
the “perception of animacy,” and thus also the perception of qualities associated with certain 
users, operators, puppeteers, animators. However, media objects that already fit the definition of 
animation in the “narrow sense” can still themselves be perceived as having agency not normally 
attributable to an object of their category. The examples I choose are both art and techne, and 
furthermore they are not tied to any religious practice. Nonetheless, I argue that their animation is 
 
24 Ibid., xiii.  
25 Betti Marenko. “Neo-Animism and Design: A New Paradigm in Object Theory. Design and Culture. 2015, 
228. Emphasis not present in original.  
26 Bennett. Vibrant Matter, 9.  
27 Silvio. Puppets, Gods, and Brands, 36.  
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at least in part a matter of perceiving agency and animacy, even if they are also animation in a 
more traditional sense, as a medium.   
Chen’s exploration of animacy originates with “Michael Silverstein’s idea of an ‘animacy 
hierarchy’,” initially used to mark different ways that subjects and objects, ranked in order of 
their degree of animacy, were treated linguistically.28 For Chen, animacy hierarchies become a 
conceptual framework, primarily developed and internalized via Western philosophy, for 
categorizing and ranking different types of entities based on their presumed or perceived level of 
animacy. Chen notes that “[a]nimacy hierarchies in Western ontologies are about kind: they 
assert that this group is affiliated with these properties.”29 However, they are also 
“simultaneously ontologies of affect,” or, in other words, “animate hierarch[ies] of possible 
acts.”30 Chen’s work demonstrates the way that linguistically, animacy hierarchies are found 
everywhere across issues of race, gender, climate, and security. Thus, the work of disrupting or 
destabilizing the conceptual formation of animacy hierarchies is not only a philosophical project 
but also a political one. The examples that I turn to in this thesis may not seem particularly 
political at all; they are popular, commercial, and seemingly non-political in terms of content or 
tone. Nonetheless, I claim their political potential lies in their destabilization of conceptual 
animacy hierarchies, and that it is worth understanding that in this sense they are not 
disconnected from broader political issues of domination, manipulation, and power.  
 
Animism 
If the production and perception of animacy and agency in categories of beings that would 
otherwise be conceived of as without such qualities destabilizes animacy hierarchies, it may be 
correct to say that the result is a push towards animism. According to Silvio, there has been a 
“long history of comparisons between animation in the narrow sense and religious animism.”31 
Animism is defined by Devin Proctor as “the recognition of some animating presence in non-
human entities,” one which is often conceived of as a “spirit” or “soul”, though that need not 
 
28 Chen. Animacies, 24. Silverstein’s ideas originated to explain different “case-markings” with regards to subjects 
and objects between ergative languages and accusative languages.  
29 Ibid. 127.  
30 Ibid. 190, 3.  
31 Silvio. Puppets, Gods, and Brands, 37. 
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necessarily be the case.32 Animism has a history of being rejected by the world of Western 
science as primitive and as premodern, with even those celebrating its presence in animation, 
such as Sergei Eisenstein, referring to it as “pre-logical.”33 Phillipe Descola was perhaps the first 
to take seriously the notion of animism within anthropology. Descola notes of animism that “it 
projects human characteristics onto nature,” something which would seem consistent with 
Silvio’s definition of animation.34 Naturally of course, Descola’s definition seems to presuppose 
that those characteristics are essentially human to begin with, something both animism and 
Silvio’s definition of animation might likely refute; Silvio adds the addendum that “qualities 
perceived as human are not necessarily uniquely or exclusively human.”35 The demonstration that 
certain qualities, or rather that certain agencies, are not uniquely human is precisely what the 
objects of this thesis do, and in part why I characterize them as “animation”. They take qualities 
and capacities presumed to be unique to a human operator (scrolling, saving, reloading, 
reassembling) and channel them into the nonhuman actant. Thus, this thesis likewise offers a 
challenge to conceptions of user, operator, or animator functions as belonging essentially to 
human actants.  
This is hardly the first project to take as a core principle the relationship between 
animation and animism. After all, as previously mentioned, the connection, at least within 
Western scholarship, dates at least as far back as Eisenstein, who sees in animation “the most 
direct manifestation of… animism!”36 Animism’s relationship to animation is studied in a way 
that treats the former more seriously today, especially through scholars such as Thomas Lamarre. 
As Silvio notes, there are also a number of ethnographic studies focusing on the relationship 
between animism and puppetry.37 However, even in many of these cases, where animism seems 
to factor into animation is primarily on the level of content, and only occasionally on the level of 
form. The former is unsurprising, given that so much animation depicts anthropomorphic 
animals, cyborg humans, and inanimate objects springing to life. What is under-represented, in 
 
32 Devin Proctor. "Cybernetic Animism." In Digital Existence: Ontology, Ethics and Transcendence in Digital Culture, 
ed. Amanda Lagerkvist. (Routledge, 2018), 227. 
33 Sergei Eisenstein. Eisenstein on Disney. Vol. 3. (Seagull Books Pvt Ltd, 1986), 41. 
34 Jensen, Casper Bruun, and Anders, Blok. "Techno-animism in Japan: Shinto Cosmograms, Actor-Network Theory, 
and the Enabling Powers of Non-human Agencies." (Theory, Culture & Society 30, no. 2. 2013), 89.  
35 Silvio. Puppets, Gods, and Brands, 19.  
36 Eisenstein. Eisenstein on Disney, 43.  
37 Ibid. 7.  
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my view, is the study of the animistic principle in media objects not in terms of content or even 
form, but in terms of negotiations of agency. This is, in part, where this project comes in.  
Animism resists a hierarchical ordering of things according to animacy, and thus agency, 
that is prevalent in other ontologies. For example, while animism is of course not absent from the 
West, much of Western philosophy has supported a comparatively naturalist framework. In the 
West, “a religious and scientific bias against animism is evident,” and as such, neither religion 
nor science can accommodate its presence.38 Thus, “[w]ithin a naturalist ontology,” as Paul 
Manning and Illana Gershon put it, “animation becomes problematic, difficult to accommodate to 
the overarching ontology, as an ‘uncanny’ category that seems to point to animistic ontological 
premises that have been superseded by naturalism.”39 Animation imbued with animistic 
principles thus operates as a critique of naturalist ontologies that are comparatively more 
dominant in the West.  
The relationship between animism and the uncanny is also hard to overlook. The 
connection between the two is made explicit in the work of the figure most associated with the 
latter term, Sigmund Freud. Freud notes that his analysis “[leads] us back to the old animistic 
view of the universe.”40 He claims that this is part of “a phase corresponding to the animistic 
phase in the development of primitive peoples,” which takes place within an individual, forging 
an association between animism and a lack of development. Lingering on Freud is mostly 
unhelpful, not only because of the framing of animism as primitive, but also because of the 
unnecessary connections it inevitably draws with sexuality and castration. However, it is also 
worth briefly considering the work that Freud, in his essay on the uncanny, is responding to, that 
of German psychiatrist Ernst Jentsch. Jentsch frames the uncanny as “intellectual uncertainty,” 
but his example is the most telling: “doubt as to whether an apparently animate object really is 
alive and, conversely, whether a lifeless object might not perhaps be animate.”41 Freud claims 
that Jentsch’s explanation of the uncanny is insufficient, but ultimately does not eschew this 
notion itself. Thus, the common denominator between Freud and Jentsch remains a general sense 
that animacy is permeating to, or receding from, categories of beings that it ought to be located 
 
38 Belk et al, “Artificial Life”, 6.  
39 Paul Manning and Ilana Gershon. "Animating Interaction." HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 3, no. 3. 2013, 
131. Emphasis not present in original. 
40 Sigmund Freud. “The Uncanny,” In The Uncanny. Translated by David McLintock. (Penguin Classics. New York: 
Penguin Books, 1919; 2003), 147.  
41 Jentsch, Ernst in Freud, “The Uncanny,” 135.  
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in, at least according to what Manning and Gershon refer to as a naturalist ontology. Japanese 
roboticist and philosopher Masahiro Mori, who coined the phrase “the uncanny valley,” 
expresses a similar relationship between the uncanny and animacy. He addresses humanness, 
movement, and healthiness as factors determining a thing’s relation to the uncanny.42 Of course, 
this is not universal. After all, we (mostly) do not get a sense of the uncanny from the inanimate 
objects that come to life in something like Toy Story. Nonetheless, that a significant dimension of 
the uncanny depends on degrees of animacy dis/appearing in ways that are less compatible with a 
dominant ontology is evident. For example, the shifting of a doll’s eyes or the movement of a 
zombie is uncanny precisely because of the incompatibility with a perceptual framework which 
renders both dolls and corpses inanimate. It is also in this focused sense that I employ the term 
“uncanny” in this thesis.  
Unlike what Freud and Eisenstein imply, animism is, of course, not a thing of the past. 
This is not only because many of those animistic traditions they refer to survive until this day 
across the world, but also because new animistic principles and practices continue to emerge. At 
a moment when the material conditions of the environment seem so charged with vivacity, and 
perhaps even animosity, towards its human inhabitants, many have turned to animism for 
answers. One must acknowledge that this animism, which is often referred to as “new animism 
studies” or neo-animism, is often being practiced by those same peoples that previously 
colonized and dismissed animists and animism.43 At the same time, it is equally problematic to 
ignore that what is new about new animism are the circumstances under which it emerges and not 
the ideas themselves. As Thomas Lamarre puts it, “the new animism should not be construed in 
terms of a rupture or definitive break with the old animism, even though it is by no means 
smoothly continuous with it.”44 Betti Marenko summarizes neo-animism as follows:  
 
Nineteenth-century positivism – with its pragmatic and rational view of social 
phenomena, and its faith in techno-scientific progress and empirical methods – saw 
 
42 Mori, M., K. F. MacDorman, and N. Kageki. “The Uncanny Valley [From the Field].” IEEE Robotics 
Automation Magazine 19, no. 2 (June 2012): 98–100. 
 
43 Silvio. Puppets, Gods, and Brands, 36. Figures associated with new animism studies include Phillipe Descola, 
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, and Nurit Bird-David.  
44 Thomas Lamarre. “Animation and Animism” In Animals, Animality, and Literature, ed. Bruce Boehrer. (Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 287.  
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animism as a failed epistemology, an error or, at best, an immature stage in the 
development of individual and society. Current notions of animism, on the other hand, 
question the boundaries between the social world (human) and the material world 
(nonhuman), as well as the animate and the inanimate. Neo-animism prompts us to 
rethink our relationships with the world, and where the frontier between human and 
nonhuman, living and non-living, might be located.45 
 
Again, much like animacy theory for Chen, the function of new animism is to trouble a smooth 
divide between living/dead, animate/inanimate, and human/nature. Lamarre adds that “the new 
animism is intended as an anti-imperial form of knowledge and practice.”46 Much as the study of 
animation drew from discourse on animism, “the new study of animation draws on many of the 
same sources as the new animism.”47 In thinking animation in terms of agency in addition to 
movement, it is my intention to situate my work here within such a continuity between animation 
and animism, and a politics of anti-imperialism as well.  
One of the major challenges involved with theorizing animation in relation to animism is 
the potential for the latter to drift back towards anthropocentrism if one sees the animating 
agency of nonhumans in strictly human terms. Lamarre points out that “[t]his is a risk whenever 
‘person’ and ‘human’ become conflated: animism may slide into anthropomorphism, and 
anthropomorphism into anthropocentrism.”48 Again, locating humanness in nonhumans must be 
distinguished from the recognition that certain properties are not essentially human, in this case, 
personhood. Because “animism requires a distinction between human and person,” Lamarre 
separates anthropomorphism from what he calls personation, “the genesis of persons” as well as 
the “relatedness arising with them.”49 In this thesis, I routinely refer to the way that 
media/character assemblages take on the properties of the human, but I treat this as a matter of 
personation rather than anthropomorphization. The examples this thesis deals with are not 
moments of perceiving the human within the nonhuman, but rather moments of seeing that 
 
45 Marenko. “Neo-Animism and Design”, 225.  
46 Lamarre, “Animation and Animism”, 287.  
47 Ibid., 289.  
48 Ibid., 290.  
49 Ibid., 291, 292.  
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particular properties, and particular types of action, can be achieved through a nonhuman 
operator.  
 
Animators – Puppeteers, Operators, Users, Gods 
With all of this in mind, I want to specify the way in which I use the term “animator” in 
this thesis, in a way that is purposely vague. The traditional sense of an animator – for example 
that of a studio animator – is not strictly the image I wish to conjure, though it is not necessarily 
exempt from my usage here. An animator, for my purposes, is a subject who “brings to life” an 
object, which most often entails a relationship of control and agency over that object.  
Puppeteers, and their digital successors, the operators of virtual avatars, are two examples of this. 
Video game players, controllers in hand, are already thought of as puppeteers, and that what they 
control is often called an “avatar,” reinforces their own godliness.50 In this sense, game players 
are animators too. Cosplayers, who use their body to bring to life a fictional character, would be 
yet another example. Of course, being human is not a requirement of animators in this sense, 
(algorithms for example can also fill this role) which is something this thesis foregrounds. For 
reasons I will continue to elaborate in the chapters that follow, players and readers are two 
additional examples. In short, this is because their object arrives to them still and “dead,” and it is 
through their will that the object is brought to life. In sum, animators are puppeteers, operators, 
and, according to some, gods.51 The relationship invoked intentionally employs almost parental 
overtones, as it is at once one of life-giving and control. The animator-animation nexus is also a 
site of animacy relations, and thus of agency negotiations. These relations also become 
hierarchical, as an animator is presumed to possess more animacy and agency than that which 
they animate. None of this is to reify or celebrate the godliness of this group of animators, but 
rather to establish how the media objects of this thesis operate as a critique of and challenge to 
this view of the animator. They disrupt the locus of “animator”-ness which destabilizes the 
presumed animacy hierarchy between readers/players, as more “animate” subjects, and 
 
50 Silvio Puppets, Gods, and Brands, 47. 
51 I should point out two things here. First, it is not the case that many animators (in the traditional sense) think of 
themselves as gods; just as often they might think themselves as channeling the characters they animate. Second, 
and more importantly, my objective in setting up animators in this way is not to reify the godlike nature of the 
animator, but rather to demonstrate how the materiality of the objects of this thesis challenge the very concept. 
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“inanimate” media objects, as objects situated on an animacy hierarchy. 
 
Methodology 
This project engages in a series of close readings of a particular set of actions: scrolling, 
reading, saving, reloading, rewriting, operating, animating, and how those actions move between 
and are contested by humans and nonhumans. In these readings the question I attend to is, “who 
animates?” In this regard, I am particularly influenced by Deborah Levitt’s methodology, in The 
Animatic Apparatus, of “media ethology.”52 Ethology is derived from the study of the behaviour 
of animals, but rather than track the behaviours of a particular species, ethology tracks a single 
behaviour across different species. Here, I am doing something similar with the behaviours of 
reading, playing, using, operating, animating. Levitt points out that “ethology is an inquiry into 
the how – rather than the who – of things.”53 This approach draws from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
approach to ethology, following from Spinoza, in asking how (“what can a body do?”) rather 
what (“what is a body?”); in attending to behaviours not ontology. Media ethology, then, “is a 
consideration of how we make sense (meaning) of sense (sensation) as these emerge together – 
and constitute one another – at the spectator-screen nexus.”54 Part of the objective then is to 
discover where “we find media – as technics and as aesthetic practices – developing lives of their 
own?”55 
The close readings of this thesis are also informed by a particular set of philosophical 
questions, which aligns with what Teri Silvio calls “animative reflexivity”. Silvio notes that 
“animative reflexivity focuses on the split between animator and animate, on questions of 
uncanny ontology – not just the illusion of autonomous life, but the possibility that it might not 
be an illusion.”56 Silvio however locates animate reflexivity primarily in the content of something 
like an animated film: the cybernetic bodies of the Ghost in the Shell (1995-) series or the toys of 
the Toy Story (1995-) films, or the cartoon character in Gertie the Dinosaur (1914) or Duck 
Amuck (1953). This thesis is to some extent concerned with animative reflexivity in a similar 
sense to those last examples, but it pairs with an animative reflexivity that centers around both 
 
52 Levitt. The Animatic Apparatus, 5.  
53 Ibid., 5.  
54 Ibid., 5.  
55 Ibid., 29.  
56 Silvio. Puppets, Gods, and Brands, 35.  
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media form as well as the relation between media and user. In the example that I opened with, for 
example, the drama involves the investment of the character Providence with agency, but the 
system itself also takes on that agency; it is both Providence and the game Bravely Second that 
threaten to erase my save file and nullify my agency.  
These close readings are then situated with debates in specific areas – in comic theory, 
game theory, and character/database theory respectively. This thesis examines how these theories 
position the human operator as an active, agential, and “animate” subject bringing to life an 
“inanimate” object; in other words, how they position the human as an animator. Moreover, that 
positioning is at times theorized to constitute the media form; comics, for example, are only 
comics if the reader is active and has agency. Through the close readings of these three media 
objects, I examine how an uncanny animacy is used not only to subvert the control the human is 
presumed to possess, but also importantly to challenge media theories that position the user, 
viewer, reader, or player as possessing agencies necessary to “breathe life into” inanimate media 
objects. I choose these three objects not strictly because they are exemplary or unique, though in 
many ways they are also that; I choose them because their uncanny animacy bleeds beyond them 
as singular instances, infecting all webtoons or all video games with a sense of agency. 
 
Chapters 
In the first chapter, I explore how the reader-comic hierarchy is destabilized in the 2011 
Korean horror webtoon The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost by artist Horang. Using the theory of comic 
artist/theorist Scott McCloud, who likens the act of reading comics to an act of in-between 
animating, I position the reader of comics as a second-order animator that puts into motion a pre-
determined sequence by virtue of their own animating agency: moving from panel to panel, 
turning pages or, in the case of webtoons, scrolling on a webpage. Using a Javascript trigger in 
order to temporarily hijack and “take over” that function, The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost 
simultaneously produces animation in the sense of continuous movement (i.e. “the narrow 
sense”), afforded by the mechanical succession of images, and in the sense of an uncanny agency 
(i.e. “the broad sense”). Drawing from the work of sociologist Erving Goffman as applied by 
Paul Manning and Illana Gershon, I suggest that this agency is that of an “uncanny animator,” an 
animator which is not uniformly present, but always retains the possibility of taking operative 
control away from the reader, which is simultaneously the possibility of becoming an animate 
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subject. The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost also alters the expectations of the reader such that the 
categorization of its media form – a webtoon – is entirely threatened. Thus, the animacy of The 
Bongcheon-Dong Ghost is, in this chapter, something which builds on debates within comic 
theory, as the categorization of webtoon images on the whole becomes ontologically uncanny. 
Much as The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost limns the boundaries of animate/inanimate, it 
simultaneously limns the boundaries of comic/animation. It is not merely a matter of combining 
the two, such as placing animated movement within comic panels; panels always have the 
potential to themselves merge in such a way as to produce fluid movement.  
The first chapter merges the uncanny “coming to life” with character animation, in the 
“narrow sense.” However, character animation is already not the only form of movement that 
imparts a sense of life to characters. In defense of limited character animation, scholars such as 
Marc Steinberg have pointed instead to the way that the character image moves across media, 
worlds, and by extension through society as part of the “media mix,” particularly as associated 
with the media ecology of Japan. The second chapter takes as its starting point a common video 
game structure which is representative of the underlying logic of “media mix.” It explores how 
the player-video game relationship is destabilized by the production of animacy in Toby Fox’s 
2015 hit indie-game Undertale. It begins by developing a conception of the function of the 
player, drawing on the work of game scholars Alexander Galloway and Liam Mitchell, as 
someone that exists to “animate” a set of diverging worlds and their contents towards an end goal 
of exhaustion. In video games, players have a world-traversing agency, continually saving, 
reloading, and restarting in order to achieve desired (or even undesired) events and endings. 
Undertale destabilizes this player agency by introducing the characters of Flowey and Chara, 
who also demonstrate temporal agencies thought to be exclusive to the player. I turn to a concept 
popularized by Japanese media cultures, kyara, which generally refers to characters unbound by 
their original narratives, to explain the particular sense of animacy produced. In effect, Undertale 
produces a condensed “kyara” within the likewise condensed “media mix” logic of the video 
game. Undertale thus operates as a critique of a positioning of player and game that maps them 
onto what I have referred to in this thesis as an animator-animation relationship. Through the 
close reading of Undertale in this chapter, I use Undertale and its animacy to build upon debates 
in game theory, while also drawing connections with character and media theory to understand 
the affect produced by Undertale.  
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While remaining focused on games, threads introduced surrounding character and media 
theory in the second chapter become centralized in the third chapter. In the objects of the first two 
chapters, animacy is produced both on the level of what is visible (i.e. character animation or 
character movement across divergent worlds), but it is also a matter of the animacy of the system: 
triggers being activated or information being secretly stored. The third chapter brings this 
structure to the forefront by examining the agency of the player in the 2017 bishōjo game by 
Team Salvato, Doki Doki Literature Club. In contrast to the “narrative consumption” with an 
end-goal of exhaustion in the second chapter, it instead focuses on the player as they engage in 
“database consumption” with an objective of reassembling to suit personal preference. It 
develops a construction of the player of the bishōjo game based on the theory of Azuma Hiroki, 
who describes the function of the player as reassembling elements of a database to suit their 
preference. Doki Doki Literature Club destabilizes the relationship between players and elements 
by producing animacy on the level of the system, in file folders and text files, and by relocating 
the functional role of such reassembling to one of its central characters, Monika. The game thus 
operates as a critique of Azuma’s database consumption and its implications for character and 
media theory. Building on theories of kyara from the second chapter, I explore how Doki Doki 
Literature Club also imparts a sense of an “uncanny character encounter” that is itself analogous 
to what Japanese media cultures call “2.5D.” Lastly, I consider how Doki Doki Literature Club, 
though in fact the other objects of this thesis as well, achieve their animacy in part through a 
channeling of the force of computing into characters.  
 These disturbing, uncomfortable, destabilizing surges of animacy reveal structures that 
both index and exacerbate particular attitudes towards the world and the human’s relationship to 
it at large, particularly in the second and third chapters. The moments of connection they afford, 
in which the human sees their thought-to-be essential agencies enacted by some Other, though 
disturbing (or perhaps because they are disturbing), demonstrate the degree to which those 
structures make possible our positioning of humans as animators of the world, and our framing of 
the world as to-be-acted-upon by humans. This positioning extends to interactions with and 
theorization of media as well, something which is challenged by the uncanny animacy these 
objects possess. It is ultimately that framing which I see challenged in the objects of this thesis, a 
framing which occludes the life of nonhumans and generates potentials for their manipulation, 





Javascript Ghost: The Uncanny Animator of The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost 
When was the last time a comic surprised you? Really surprised you? 
Scott McCloud on The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost57 
I was just as surprised as Scott McCloud was when I first read The Bongcheon-Dong 
Ghost, a viral Korean webtoon by the artist Horang (real name Choi Jong-ho) four years after its 
2011 release, on my iPad.58 That last detail may seem irrelevant, but in fact it had major 
ramifications on that initial viewing experience, as I will soon elaborate. What made The 
Bongcheon-Dong Ghost surprising had little to do with its content, narrative, or style. Rather, it 
radically transformed the relationship that I thought I had with it as a media object, what I 
thought reading a comic (or webcomic or webtoon) inherently meant.  
The story, based on a popular Korean urban legend, follows a schoolgirl walking home 
alone late at night. The girl stumbles upon a strange woman in dirty pink pajamas with tattered 
hair, who appears to be acting strangely. Frozen, the girl watches the woman, whose head spins 
around unnaturally to reveal a bloodied smiling face and lifeless eyes. The schoolgirl is petrified 
as the terrifying entity before her asks: “WHERE IS MY BABY?” Hoping to get the woman as 
far away from her as possible, the girl points off into the distance. The schoolgirl then attempts to 
flee the situation, but the voice of the woman rings out: “SHE IS NOT HERE!!!” Barreling on 
twisted and contorted arms and legs, the woman lunges at and attacks the girl; everything turns to 
black. The schoolgirl later learns that her neighbour found her passed out and took her home. The 
story concludes by stating that in 2007, a 33-year-old woman by the name of Mrs. Cho, having 
 
57 Scott McCloud. ‘BOO!’. ScottMcCloud.com. August 23rd, 
2011.http://scottmccloud.com/2011/08/23/boo/?fbclid=IwAR0YLxOtPEjx0Gv3i_oxr0iKh2lUXhIHo3JbWUZNwhWn9
xwR8SUMKp7goKE.  
58 ‘Webtoon’, a portmanteau of ‘web’ and ‘cartoon’ refers to a Korean media form that is distinct from webcomics. 
So-young Sung. “Webtoon fever catches on overseas” Korea JoongAng Daily (2019). 
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2943855 
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lost custody of her two-year-old daughter, committed suicide in Bongcheon-Dong, Gwang-Ak-
Gu, Seoul, and that she had been spotted wandering around several times since.    
After the first reading of what I initially deemed to be a rather conventional ghost story, I 
was more confused than anything else. What had been most notable about the webtoon was that 
at two points there was a series of several unusually incremental “moment-to-moment” panel 
transitions, using a great number of panels to depict the movement of the ghost.59 Had the goal 
been to create what would be experienced as fluid movement, I deemed that the creator 
ultimately failed; the ghost seemed slow, and the technique did nothing but remind me that I was 
reading a comic. Later that night, I read The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost for a second time. I sat at 
my computer, in a dark basement room, scrolling through the sequence of events, analyzing each 
panel meticulously.  
 
The schoolgirl is walking alone 
she sees the ghost 
it turns around, and --  
 
I nearly fell out of my chair.  
 
Mrs. Cho moved, came to life even. It took me a moment to process what had happened. 
Her eerie, smiling, bloodied face, having returned to a state of stillness, lingered on the screen. I 
put my hand back on the mouse and began to scroll down again slowly and anxiously. The story 
continued as normal, until those words appeared once again: “SHE IS NOT HERE!!!” Then it 
happened again: Mrs. Cho and her contorted figure lunged at the screen, jumping through the 
frame of the panel as if her momentum would carry her out of the webtoon where she had been 
confined. The movement was not “in my head” as it had been before, it was really there. I 
finished the webtoon, sat back in my chair, and waited for my heart rate to settle. I later learned 
that the “trick” of The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost didn’t work on tablets and mobile devices. 
 
59 Scott McCloud. Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art. (New York: William Morrow ,1993),70-72. As an aside, 
it’s worth point out that the ghost also moves beyond the boundaries of the frame. Nead characterizes the frame 
as the divide “between the living and the dead”. This is a separate technique from what I discuss in this chapter, 
but it is worth noting that these different techniques are working together. Lynda Nead. The Haunted Gallery: 




Figure 1 This is an example of how The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost appeared on mobile devices 
(here taken as screenshots from an iPhone) These three screenshots show different moments in 
the scroll. When functioning correctly however, the viewer will not see these individual 
frames/panels but will only see them fused in continuous motion. 
My reaction to The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost was one of many highly similar reactions. In 
2011, The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost went viral, both in Korea and internationally. Many popular 
internet personalities on platforms such as YouTube posted videos of themselves or their friends 
reacting to reading the webtoon.60 The popularity of these reaction videos, and that many of them 
essentially took the form of a “prank”, speaks to the novelty of the technique. Specifically, the 
technique of The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost relies on a categorical assumption regarding webtoons 
as media form; the appeal for eliciting reactions was the sheer unthinkability that comics, which 
are supposed to be a sequence of still images, would be moved by anything but the hand of the 
reader. So how did those images actually move?  
 
60 “The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost”. Know Your Meme. 2019. https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/the-bongcheon-
dong-ghost.  
 22 
 The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost uses Javascript triggers at two key moments in the narrative, 
once when the ghost first reveals her face, and again when the ghost attacks the protagonist.61 
These triggers, activated when the reader reaches a certain point in the webtoon, prompt an auto-
scroll; the webtoon quickly scrolls through the aforementioned incremental moment-to-moment 
transitions, resulting in moments of animation within the webtoon. Critically, the webtoon does 
not simply insert moving image media formats (such as GIFs) into the webpage that hosts the 
webtoon.62 Each panel of The Bongcheon-Dong is still laid out spatially on the webpage that 
features it, as any other comic.  Thus, while it is shocking that the images of The Bongcheon-
Dong Ghost move, it is arguably that the webtoon scrolls, taking over the controls used to read it, 
that is a greater source of unease. On the one hand, this action is implicitly contextualized as part 
of the agency of Mrs. Cho; she can move within and outside the webtoon. On the other hand, 
regardless of whether the reader has comprehension of the mechanics of the movement, the 
relationship between viewer-reader and image becomes destabilized in an intractable way. In 
what follows, I characterize this as a destabilization of both a still/moving image binary, which 
here refers both to the fusion of discontinuous panels as well as an animate/inanimate binary, 
which maps degrees of liveness onto the reader and the webtoon respectively.   
In this chapter, I explore the way in which The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost unsettles the 
status of the webtoon image, such that the reader's relationship to and expectations of those 
images becomes fundamentally rewritten. It achieves this through an act of animation; 
“animation” in two senses: both a commonplace sense of the fusion of discontinuous 
frames/panels as continuous movement, as well as an expanded sense of the production of an 
agent possessing qualities of animacy. Specifically, it relocates and reflects the function of the 
human which engages with it as a particular type of animator. As a result, the animation that The 
Bongcheon-Dong Ghost employs results in a destabilization of structures of both agency and 
animacy. Here, I tend to use the terms “role” or agent, but I employ them interchangeably with 
such terms as actor, actant, and function. I argue that the nature of the agent that is brought to life 
in the webtoon is that of an “uncanny animator”, which in short refers to the “bringing to life,” or 
 
61 On other applications/websites, such as WEBTOON (perhaps the most popular webtoon platform), the webtoon 
seems to make use of GIFs rather than Javascript (I have not yet confirmed this). The result is a very different 
effect.  
62 Horang actually released a webtoon earlier that same year, Ok-Su Station Ghost, that used a technique more 
approximate to a GIF (a looping image format) 
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animation, of an actant which animates the webtoon, or an animator. This layered act of 
animation, I argue, produces a space wherein both the media object (The Bongcheon-Dong 
Ghost) and its contents (i.e. the character Mrs. Cho) are always potentially animated. The result 
of this is that the space that is produced can be likened to an animist ontology, in that the 
webtoon can possess qualities of lifelikeness and humanity. In sum, The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost 
prompts us to reconsider the relationship between comics and animacy, by foregrounding the way 
in which the webtoon as media form participates in the destabilization of what Mel Y. Chen calls 
an “animacy hierarchy.” The stakes of this analysis are the ways in which The Bongcheon-Dong 
Ghost in particular, and via its unique mobilization of movement, webtoons as digital media form 
more generally, have the potential to destabilize animacy hierarchies and open up a space in 
which the nonhuman (the webtoon) can be considered “animated.” This in turn produces a 
different reading experience of all webtoons, bleeding beyond the confines of The Bongcheon-
Dong Ghost to infect all webtoons subsequently. 
 
Webtoon as Media Form 
Before delving into the specifics of The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost, it is helpful to provide 
some brief context for webtoons as a media form, given that despite being popular in Korea for 
two decades, they are still in a process of obtaining a wider global circulation. When the term 
“webtoon” was first popularized in Korea in 2000, its meaning was more approximate to what 
today in the West and elsewhere are called webcomics: comics, often not of an episodic serial 
format, which use the conventional layout and panel structure of print comics, but are created and 
distributed by digital means.63 In the past two decades however, the meaning of webcomics and 
webtoons has drifted apart; the latter developing formal and stylistic conventions that clearly 
distinguish them from “digital comics” in other regions.64 Webtoons are published as vertical 
strips which in theory extend ad infinitum. They treat the screen of the computer or smartphone 
as a window through which the webtoon is viewed, and which can be moved vertically but not 
horizontally. The same year that the term “webtoon” was first coined, Scott McCloud released 
Reinventing Comics (2000). In it, he describes the concept of the “infinite canvas”: that rather 
 
63 Dal Yong Jin. "Digital Convergence of Korea’s Webtoons: Transmedia Storytelling." Communication 
Research and Practice 1, no. 3, 2015: 193. 
64 Ibid, 197.  
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than think of the screen as a page, comic artists could instead allow it to act as a window, freeing 
them from the limitations of the page structure, and allowing them to use the direction of panels 
in different ways depending on the stories they wanted to tell.65 The webtoon form has been 
understood as a popularized realization of some of the possibilities of this principle.66 Several 
formal properties of webtoons are worth drawing attention to here. First, they are “infinite” 
vertically but not horizontally. Second, each webtoon is generally hosted on a single webpage, 
and thus the media form does not rely on the page structure characteristic of comic books. Third, 
as a result of these two things, the eyes of the reader are generally fixated on their computer or 
mobile screen as a single point rather than, as an alternative, scanning across pages or panels in 
traditional left-to-right, up-to-down fashion. I point this out because this allows the comic strip of 
the webtoon to share several properties with a film strip, something which The Bongcheon-Dong 
Ghost uses to its advantage to produce motion.  
However, what is perhaps most important to highlight with webtoons as a media format is 
that they are a natively digital format. That is to say that the relationship between webtoons and 
digital media is not merely one of distribution, something potentially overlooked or under 
emphasized by those who consume webtoons. In many cases, much of the presence of comic art 
as it exists digitally is framed as essentially “print comics, but hosted online”, and this is even 
more true in many regions outside Korea, in places where natively digital formats have not 
gained widespread popularity. That is not to say that artists outside of Korea have not 
experimented with integrating the moving image into comics (McCloud has a number of 
examples of this), though in certain areas of the world, particularly certain Western territories 
where The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost circulated widely (e.g. in North America), it remains rare.67 
More importantly, even with the consideration of these examples, still and moving images 
continue to be thought of as separate elements that can each be categorized as such. Digital 
media, such a conception holds, merely affords the opportunity to mix these elements in the 
space of a single comic, not to destabilize the relationship between the two altogether. Thus, the 
 
65 Scott McCloud. Reinventing Comics: How Imagination and Technology are Revolutionizing an Art Form. 
(Harper Collins, 2000), 222.  
66 Heekyoung Cho. “The Webtoon: A New Form of Graphic Narrative.” The Comics Jounal. 2016. 
http://www.tcj.com/the-webtoon-a-new-form-for-graphic-narrative/.2016. The infinite canvas is also mentioned 
on the Wikipedia entry for ‘webtoon’. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Webtoon. It is also worth pointing out, 
however obvious, that the “infinite” canvas is still limited by the computer’s ability to load the webpage itself. 
67 McCloud. Reinventing Comics, 209.  
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general tendencies regarding the presence of comic art online construct a set of expectations 
about what “digital comics,” are and can be, something which The Bongheon-Dong Ghost 
subverts by virtue of its demonstration of certain technical affordances. However, that subversion 
is not simply a matter of revealing a hidden technicity of the webtoon image, but also, as I will 
demonstrate, a matter of rewriting the reader’s own relationship to the images of webtoons 
altogether.  
 
Comic Readers as Animators 
In Understanding Comics, Scott McCloud develops a comprehensive theory of comics 
which details the mechanics of comic readership, and in particular celebrates the active role that 
the reader plays in the production of illusory movement. For McCloud, the thoughtful 
juxtaposition of images produces movement that is not yet in motion, something which is put into 
motion by the movement of the reader’s eyes across “the gutter”, the space between panels68. For 
example, the reader of a comic views an image of a closed eye juxtaposed with an open eye, and 
by reading the images in sequence, fuses them together, transforming them in order to perceive 
them as the continuous movement of an eye opening. In other words, the movement of the 
reader’s eyes across panels, and their ability to fuse together the action of the panels into a 
continuity, puts the sequence into motion, or in other words animates it, analogous to the way 
that a projector animates a film. The reader is a “collaborator”69 with the comic creator(s), an 
“equal partner in crime,” their role being that they effectively bring an authored, and hence pre-
determined, sequence into a flow of movement and time.70 It is critical that McCloud sees what 
he calls closure, “observing the parts but perceiving the whole”, as a voluntary process, one 
which also constitutes comics as a form.71 In McCloud’s most telling analogy, he likens the 
comic reader to an in-between animator, claiming that their role is filling in the gaps between key 
frames or key panels.72 Of course, this is not to say that comic readers are animators in every 
sense of the term. They do not exactly fit the archetypal image of the studio animator; they do not 
give shape to comics, nor are comics their invisible thoughts given visible form. Nonetheless, at 
 
68 McCloud. Understanding Comics, 66.  
69 Ibid., 65. 
70 Ibid., 68. 
71 Ibid, 63,67. “Comics is closure!” 
72 Ibid., 88. Emphasis not present in original.  
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least as McCloud defines them, comic readers are animators in this specific and mechanical 
sense, and the important point is that this categorizes them as a more active agent in comparison 
to the viewer of film or television.  
 
Figure 2 The reader fuses together discontinuous panels into a continuous motion, performing work similar to that of an in-
between animator. Image taken from https://understandingcomics177.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/mvmnt2mvmnt3.jpg 
The relationship between the reader, creator, and comic bears some implicit similarities 
with the way in which Paul Manning and Illana Gershon, in “Animating Interactions” repurpose 
a participant framework for communicative acts put forth by sociologist Erving Goffman to suit 
theory on animation.73 Such a framework can be used to clarify the relationship between the 
primary actants in traditional comic readership. Goffman’s framework identifies three roles: 
animator, author, and principal. He would eventually add a fourth role to these: the figure. 
Bracketing the “principal” and “figure”, of particular interest to this analysis are the “animator” 
and the “author”.  While Goffman’s analysis is of acts of communication, the roles he identifies 
are in some ways suitable for mediation in general, and thus have salience for thinking animation. 
Manning and Gershon note that whereas an author is the actant “who selects the words that 
constitute the utterance”, the role of the animator is “largely about producing the sounds that 
constitute the utterance.”74 They use the example of quoting the lyrics of a song, in which the 
author is the one who wrote the song, and the animator is the one quoting it. One can easily see 
 
73 Paul Manning and Ilana Gershon. "Animating Interaction." HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 3, no. 3 .2013, 
111. 
74 Ibid.  
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how this maps on to McCloud’s reader-as-animator; writing a lyric is to creating a comic as 
quoting a lyric is to reading a comic. In some ways this is fairly obvious, but the division of these 
roles will become central to understanding the full effect of The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost.  
To further expand this framework, I turn to the analysis of Thomas Lamarre. Lamarre 
opens The Anime Machine (2009) with an unexpected object: the speeding train. His reason for 
doing so, however, becomes quickly apparent. In his example, the passenger of the train is 
viewing animation in an unconventional way, by observing a series of thoughtfully juxtaposed 
images on an outside wall through the train window, from within the train. Due to the high speed 
of the train, these moments become fused together and, to the passenger viewing the image from 
within the train, they appear to be moving. For Lamarre, the force of animation is intimately 
intertwined with the affordances and limitations of the speeding train. What effectively forms the 
critical difference between this example for Lamarre and the way that film produces movement is 
that “it is the movement of the viewer not the movement of the film that transforms the series of 
static images into a moving picture.”75 In Lamarre’s account, difference is constituted on the 
basis of what is being moved (the image or the viewer), and yet ironically what arguably matters 
most is what becomes the most invisible: the movement of the train. The train is the equivalent of 
the “speaker” or “animator” in Manning and Gershon’s example. I bring attention to this example 
as both a particularly transparent illustration of the location of the act of animation in the 
nonhuman actant as well as a demonstration of the invisibility of that same actant as the motion it 
generates is channelled into the image itself. Extending Goffman’s framework to include not only 
sequences of sounds and words, but also of images, it becomes possible to think Lamarre’s train 
example in these terms. Specifically, the one who created the set of images to be placed on the 
wall is the author, and the train itself becomes the animator.  
Needless to say, the same lines could be drawn between, say, the authorship of a film strip 
and its animation by means of the projector.76 The limitations of Goffman’s model, and where it 
will require some additive elements here, is that it accounts only for the roles involved on the side 
of the “sender”, and not the roles that exist on the receiving end. I propose that we might 
transform what is useful in this case about Goffman’s framework for thinking animation by 
 
75 Thomas Lamarre. The Anime Machine: A Media Theory of Animation. (U of Minnesota Press. 2009), xiii.  
76 In terms of authorship, Lamarre’s train example might be a simpler example than that of film, because most film 
is shot with a camera, which fragments the role of authorship.  
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identifying the following roles: author, medium, viewer, and animator. Of course, these don’t 
have to be four distinct actants; this is important because any role can also double as the role of 
the animator. The animator may, in different arrangements, simultaneously be the author, the 
medium or, as Scott McCloud identifies it for the case of comics, the viewer. Lastly, as 
Lamarre’s example illustrates, the animator may also be a separate entity entirely. Using 
Goffman’s framework, the “author” of the comic and the reader-as-“animator” adopt different 
and collaborative roles in an act of animation. The author produces a set of “dead” elements 
assembled in a particular way, as if unspoken words on a page, and the reader reads them “to 
life.” Under the framework which I have developed here, McCloud’s reader is both the “viewer” 
as well as the “animator” 
In comics then, the role of animating, of putting a sequence of images into motion for the 
reader, is the reader themselves, and they are also the one who thus has control over time and 
movement. The reader can slow down, speed up, or stop the motion of the comic altogether at 
any moment they please. They thus take on a dual role of processing (animating) and receiving 
(viewing). Other animation technologies can be construed as similar on this basis. In fact, this has 
at times been the case, with different genealogies of media forms and technologies being formed 
on the basis of how its user engages with it.  For example, Donald Crafton draws a line through 
different genealogies of animation technologies precisely on this basis: “viewer mode of 
attraction” vs. “player mode of attraction.”77 We might characterize his distinction as one in 
which the animator is the media technology itself, reducing the role of the viewer to merely that 
of receiving (viewer mode), and one in which the animator is the viewer themselves, allowing 
them to take on a more active role (player mode).  
The role of animator does not need to be confined to a single entity, nor to a human one. 
In some cases, the animator can be an external human agent (the Japanese art of kamishibai is a 
good example) or an external nonhuman agent (Lamarre’s train). 78 The animator role can also be 
itself an assemblage made up of any combination of humans and nonhumans (e.g. projector + 
projectionist). Importantly, and consistent with Goffman’s framework, there is no reason to 
suggest that the animator role cannot itself become mobile during the course of a single act of 
 
77 Donald Crafton. "The Veiled Genealogies of Animation and Cinema." Animation 6, no. 2. 2011, 99.  
78 Kamishibai is a Japanese form of sequential art which was particularly popular in the early-to-mid 20th century. In 
kamishibai, a series of panels are manipulated through a frame by a presenter. Kamishibai then also consists of a 
series of panels/frames, but is distinguished in that a human presenter “animates” it.  
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animation; the act of quoting a lyric could, naturally, be divided among speakers. However, this 
analogy does not port easily to discussion of animation; the actant or assemblage that generates 
animation does not tend to shift over its course, generally as a technical necessity. Thus, the 
viewer typically approaches any experience of animated media (broadly speaking and including 
comics) with consistent expectations regarding the animator role. And, in the case of comics, they 
implicitly understand that they fill this role themselves. By contrast, in film, they are aware that 
this is largely the role of projector/projectionist but may participate in the intentional occluding of 
this role in order to experience the “illusion”. In any case however, this role is typically treated by 
the viewer as having some stability. 
In sum, the reader of a comic is conceptualized as an active agent that transforms still 
images into moving images according to their will. The comic reader is an animator. And this 
role is treated with such stability that it constitutes comics as a form; if the reader is not doing 
this, they are no longer reading a comic. For the most part, this stability of the animator carries 
over even as comics become remediated as webtoons. That is to say, though the reader may 
recognize many of the distinct formal properties of webtoons (i.e. vertical layout, lengthy panels), 
and the way in which they deviate from the conventions of other forms of comics, the anchoring 
point for the reader is that they are able to presume that the webtoon should, and can, be read as 
any other comic, that they will read it as the animator. And certainly, in practice this tends to be 
true for most webtoons. The impact of The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost however, is not to simply 
“reverse” the viewer-as-animator model, and to say, make the experience more analogous to 
viewing a film, but rather to destabilize the role altogether, through the production of both its 
animation (the image which moves) and a particular type of animator (that which moves the 
image). It does not wholly relocate the human-like role of animator in the nonhuman webtoon, 
but rather unsettles the ability to locate such a role at any moment. Hence, I refer to the animator 
of The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost as the uncanny animator, one which is always potentially the 
animator, but never the sole animator, their role never being stable across time. 
 
Animation as Techne, Animation as Animacy 
What is clear from the characterization of the comic reader according to those like Scott 
McCloud is that they are an active agent in the process of animating comics; comic panels are 
still images, but the reader can transform them into moving images. This relationship is co-
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constitutive; the agency of the reader is possible and necessary because of the status of comic 
images. Thus, the status of the image, as is somewhat obvious, is categorized as “inanimate.” 
However, this is primarily to say that the comic is “inanimate” within the framework of what 
anthropologist Teri Silvio refers to as animation in the “narrow sense.”79 The narrow sense, for 
Silvio, thinks of animation in terms of a set of techniques and technologies – and I will add, 
foregrounds movement - and is the way that animation has been predominantly theorized in the 
twenty-first century.  
The “narrow sense” of animation evokes a sensibility linked to the technicity of images 
associated with particular animation technologies, here largely referring to “a kind of cinema or 
video.”80 Generally speaking, while it has roots that intertwine with spiritual or theological 
thinking, it has been historically distilled and secularized to refer primarily to properties of 
movement, rather than properties of life (though naturally it is often movement that resembles 
life). Donald Crafton outlines a doubled sense of the term animation, one theological and one 
secular, originating from Romance language (animer, s’animer) and Latin (anima, 
animationem).81 The theological meaning invokes a sense of bestowing life, being alive, or being 
lively, whereas the secular only means to be moved or changed.82 In roughly the past five 
centuries, use of the term “animation” moved away from “being alive”. Certainly by at least the 
19th century, there was “no suggestion of a magical coming to life” in popular discourse on new 
animation technologies83. Current popular definitions of animation continue this trend, such as 
Norman McLaren’s definition of “the art of manipulating the invisible interstices that lie between 
frames” or Tom Gunning’s definition of animation as “the transformation of stillness into 
motion.” 84 Most contemporary uses of animation as a term then either situate it as a sub-category 
or super-category of film and video.85 Comics, as outlined in the previous section, seem to 
 
79 Teri Silvio. Puppets, Gods, and Brands: Theorizing the Age of Animation from Taiwan. (University of  
Hawaii Press, 2019), 3.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Crafton, “The Veiled Genealogies of Animation and Cinema”, 97. 
82 Ibid., 98. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Tom Gunning. “Animating the Instant: The Secret Symmetry Between Animation and Photography. In Animating 
Film Theory, ed. Karen Redrobe Beckman. (Duke University Press, 2014), 51. Norman McLaren in Lamarre, The 
Anime Machine, xxiv.  
85 Silvio, Puppets, Gods, and Brands, 33. Silvio argues that “most academic theorizing of animation has taken place 
within film and media studies”. One of the central debates around the definition of animation within film studies 
stems from claims made by Manovich (that making films in the digital age is an act of animation) and Cholodenko 
(that as an illusion of movement, all cinema is animation). Some scholars, such as Crafton, have strongly argued 
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occupy something of a liminal space on the periphery of these definitions. It is possible to frame 
them as animated in this sense only with the active agency of the reader, who themselves 
manipulate the “invisible interstices,” McCloud’s “gutter” that lie between panels, transforming 
stillness into motion.  
Animation “in the narrow sense” is not the only way of framing the status of an object 
however, nor need it be the only one relevant for categorizing media objects. That is, animation 
also retains meaning in what Silvio calls “the broad sense,” which refers instead to the investment 
of objects with qualities of life, which may include, but are not limited to, movement.86 While 
this definition continues threads of the theological or magical sensibilities that fall away in the 
diverging definition above, it need not be rendered strictly in those terms. That is, it need not be a 
question of classifying objects as “alive” per se, though it certainly can be, but it is more broadly 
the investment of objects with agency. Teri Silvio provides a concise definition as part of a 
proposal for an anthropological approach to animation studies. Silvio defines animation as: 
 
the construction of social others through the projection of qualities  
perceived as human—life, soul, power, agency, intentionality, personality, and so on— 
outside the self and into the sensory environment, through acts of creation, perception,  
and interaction.87 
 
Two examples Silvio provides help solidify this definition: (1) perceiving a rock as “alive,” 
assuming one does not tend to culturally treat rocks as alive, and (2) “ventriloquizing what you 
think your cat is thinking/saying.”88 In the second example, though one does not believe the cat 
can speak, or is actually speaking, they project onto it the act of speaking. For Silvio, this process 
of animation is about the construction of alterity. Were one to, for example, ventriloquize a rock, 
they transform that rock into an Other, bringing it into a different sense of life and a different 
capacity for interaction.89  On the one hand, what is useful about Silvio’s definition is that it 
 
against these positions. Lev Manovich. The Language of New Media. (MIT press, 2001). Alan Cholodenko. "Still 
Photography?." Afterimage 32, no. 5 (2005): 5. 
86 Silvio. Puppets, Gods, and Brands, 3.  
87 Ibid., 19. 
88 Ibid., 19.  
89 Silvio’s “animation studies” is meant to offer an alternative and compliment to the paradigm of “performance 
studies”. Silvio found that questions that previously elicited detailed responses from stage performers (e.g. “how 
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centers a particular set of qualities, a set which is intrinsically similar to what Mel Y. Chen calls 
animacy: qualities of “agency, awareness, mobility, and liveness.”90 We might thus characterize 
Silvio’s definition as a matter of investing objects with animacy.  This affords productive 
comparisons between something like The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost, and the ghost that it attempts 
to conjure a tangible sense of. What types of aesthetic experience afford a sense of a ghostly 
presence, and how are those qualities similar to the formal properties of The Bongcheon-Dong 
Ghost itself? On the other hand, that the definition begins with the act of “projection” seemingly 
centers human action and intention. What then might an “animation” which includes both 
movement and agency, yet does not center the human and depend upon projection, look like?  
 Shunsuke Nozawa, in his discussion of seiyū (voice actors) in Japan, borrows the term 
“ensoulment” (i.e. “practices of ensouling matters”) from Victoria Nelson to refer to what Silvio 
calls “animation.”91 Also drawing from discussions of “soulful bodies” in animation within the 
work of Thomas Lamarre, Nozawa asks the question: how do characters get ensouled?92 Without 
ignoring that much of its use is idiomatic, ensoulment could reasonably substitute for Silvio’s 
animation. In Nozawa’s example however, it is not an act of projection on the part of the seiyū, 
but rather the channeling of their material voice, and thus their animacy, that constructs the 
animated character as a figure of alterity such that they are perceived by the viewer as animate, 
not just in terms of movement, but in terms of animacy. Here I borrow “channeling” from the 
way in which it is used by Thomas Lamarre to describe animation as technical forces experienced 
as vitality (this is something I will return to in Chapter 3).93 Ensoulment also captures something 
of a categorical transformation, something similar to what Lamarre calls “personation” or “the 
genesis of persons.”94 It captures the moment in which an inanimate object becomes a human or 
nonhuman person, or in this case when the comic stops feeling like a comic and starts feeling like 
 
do you get into character?”) did not do so as well for puppeteers, as the process did not involve introjection and 
identiy but rather projection and alterity.   
90 Mel Y. Chen. Animacies: Biopolitics, racial mattering, and queer affect. (Duke University Press, 2012), 2.  
91 Shunsuke Nozawa. "Ensoulment and Effacement in Japanese Voice Acting." In Media Convergence in Japan, eds. 
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93 Thomas Lamarre. "Speciesism, Part III: Neoteny and the Politics of Life." Mechademia 6, no. 1 (2011): 114. 
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a ghost. To map a shift from the animacy of a “normal” comic to the animacy of a ghost, one 
would need to understand what the animacy of a comic is. Within that broader set of objects 
which channel animacy, or have it projected onto them – talismans and fetishes, but also puppets 
and automata -  where might one supposedly situate comics?95 Are comics and the bodies they 
feature, for example, more akin to automata, requiring only an initial spark to remain animate, or 
to puppets, requiring the continual presence of the animating hand of a puppeteer? 
 The discussion to this point makes it evident that the latter is the case; comics would be 
more analogous to puppets. They are inherently “inanimate” objects, but they can become 
“animate” by virtue of being invested with the continuous agency of the reader. As such, 
McCloud’s reader-as-animator is also an animator in this sense. Without overlooking that the 
materiality of comics is not irrelevant to its reader, that things such as panel structure and the 
flow of lines contribute to its perceived motion, there remains a sense that, much like 
“ventriloquizing your cat,” the reader is continually projecting movement onto the comic. This 
allows the reader to conceptualize comics as having a particular degree of animacy, but also to 
situate them relationally as part of what Chen calls an “animacy hierarchy”. Chen provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the “idea of an ‘animacy hierarchy’” which originates from Michael 
Silverstein.96 They note that such a hierarchy frames certain subjects as possessing a greater 
degree of qualities associated with life, humanity, and agency.97 Chen claims that “animacy is 
much more than the state of being animate” in that it also denotes “an hierarchy of possible 
acts.”98 Comics are situated as part of a similar hierarchy which defines them by what they 
cannot do, and what their reader can do to them, just as puppets are defined by the existence and 
capabilities of puppeteers. Readers are “animate” subjects that bring to life, that animate, the 
“inanimate” class of objects that are comics. In challenging the theorization of the comic reader 
 
95 I am inspired to ask these questions by other scholars who make productive comparisons between a lineage of 
artificial life – puppets, automata, artificial life – and media forms. For example, Deborah Levitt in The Animatic 
Apparatus makes a productive comparison between the artificial life forms featured in Oshii Mamoru’s Ghost in the 
Shell: Innocence (2004) and the way in which the film itself is reflexive about itself as a form of artificial life. For 
Levitt, this prompts comparison between the two. In response, I am prompted to think how the comic as a form of 
artificial life differs in terms of animacy when compared to film. Deborah Levitt. The Animatic Apparatus: 
Animation, Vitality, and the Futures of the Image. (John Hunt Publishing, 2018), 49. 
96 Chen. Animiacies, 24.  
97 Ibid., 24.  
98 Ibid., 4,3. 
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as animator, the destabilizing acts of The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost likewise challenge the logic of 
animacy hierarchies in turn.  
 
Uncanny Animation, Uncanny Animator 
The destabilizing act that The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost performs on the perceptual 
framework of the reader-comic relationship occurs on two levels: destabilizing both the 
still/moving binary, which corresponds to animation “in the narrow sense” as well as the 
inanimate/animate binary, which corresponds to animation “in the broad sense.”99 The latter is 
achieved through the agency of the Javascript command that hijacks the scroll function and 
wrests control from the reader, rendering them a mere viewer. But moreover, that agency is 
channeled into the fusion of discontinuous instants afforded by the mechanical succession of 
images. Thus, the two layers of animation become inseparable; a computational force becomes 
experienced as animacy and as movement. This is a construction which allows the comic to draw 
parallels between the two; the activation of the Javascript trigger is likened to a dead thing (the 
ghost) haunting the webtoon.  
In the first sense, the destabilizing effect is, naturally, most palpable in the time after the 
first Javascript trigger is activated. This unsettling permeates through the remainder of the 
webtoon (and beyond): from the time it demonstrates its capacity to move, every approaching 
panel has the capacity to be animate. Even as an image comes into view on the computer 
window or mobile screen, seeming initially to be arriving as a still image, continuing to scroll 
might at any point spring the image into movement, a proverbial minefield of animation. And yet 
perhaps even more importantly, this sensibility permeates beyond this singular subversive 
webtoon; any webtoon might, without warning, begin to move as The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost 
does. As a result, though most of the images in The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost may ultimately be 
experienced as still, the images of comic panels in webtoons cannot be wholly categorized as 
still; so long as they are webtoons, they might potentially move. The destabilizing act bleeds 
beyond The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost itself, shifting the horizon of expectations in terms of 
animation for all webtoons. This emphasis on potentials and tendencies, rather than rigid 
classification, is not unlike an animist ontology. 
 
99 Silvio, Puppets, Gods, and Brands, 3. 
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In the second sense, what evokes the uncanny in The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost is not 
simply an oscillation between stasis and movement, but the construction of a competing 
animator; one whose presence/absence mirrors and is tied to the status of the image. Returning to 
Silvio’s definition of animation as the production of a social actant, this is one way in which The 
Bongcheon-Dong Ghost “animates”: bringing to life another animator, the occluded Javascript, 
experienced only as the ghost itself. Though it is still the reader-viewer that is perceiving the 
animation, an act of projection (i.e. McCloud’s sense of “animating” comics) is replaced with an 
experience of the materiality of the Javascript, its computational force becoming experienced as a 
production of life. However, that production of life is not stable, it exists in the uncanny 
boundary between inanimate/animate.  
Here, I employ a focused sense of the uncanny that is not in all senses, as would most 
often be the case, Freudian. Ernst Jentsch, writing over a decade earlier, and to whom Freud is 
responding in his famous essay, uses a central example: “doubt as to whether an apparently 
animate object really is alive and, conversely, whether a lifeless object might not perhaps be 
animate.”100 Freud expands Jentsch’s concept of “intellectual uncertainty”, making an association 
(albeit problematically) with “the old animistic view of the universe… the idea that the world was 
peopled with human spirits.”101 Animism as a common denominator between the uncanny and 
animation comes full circle with Sergei Eisenstein, who is credited as the first in a lineage of 
linking animation with animism (like Freud he also characterized animism as primitive). 102 
Masahiro Mori, who coined the term “the uncanny valley”, likewise saw degrees of lifelike-ness 
and motion as the qualities that determined the elicitation of the uncanny.103 What I draw out 
 
100 Jentsch in Sigmund Freud. “The Uncanny,” In The Uncanny. Translated by David McLintock. (Penguin 
Classics.New York: Penguin Books, 1919; 2003.), 135.  
101 Ibid, 147. Emphasis not present in original. What I claim is problematic about Freud’s account is that he locates 
animism as belonging essentially to the past, declaring it as not only a “phase in the development of primitive 
peoples” (147), but also further associating it with the infant mind. 
102 Sergei Eisenstein. Eisenstein on Disney. Vol. 3. (Seagull Books Pvt Ltd. 1986), 43. “The animated drawing is the 
most direct manifestation of… animism!” With regards to the “primitive” connotation: Eisenstein refers to “man 
brought back, as it were, to those pre-stages that were traced out by… Darwin.” 10.  
103 Masahiro Mori., K. F. MacDorman, and N. Kageki. “The Uncanny Valley [From the Field].” IEEE Robotics 
Automation Magazine 19, no. 2 (June 2012): 98–100. 
99. For Mori, the more something which is clearly not alive resembles a human, the greater the sense of the 
uncanny. He notes that a whole robot would be more uncanny than a single prosthetic hand (100). Movement 
amplifies the position of something on his graph, with the deepest point of the valley only being accessible when 
something resembling a living creature but known to be inanimate begins to move. Interestingly, health is also a 
factor for Mori, which is interesting given Chen’s focus on the supposed lower animacy of disabled bodies in 
Animacies.   
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from these definitions, and how I employ the term here, is that a significant dimension of the 
uncanny is founded upon moments wherein one experiences entities that which would 
traditionally be classified as having a certain degree of animacy as in fact having much more or 
much less, or perhaps more specifically, being unable to definitively categorize them on such a 
hierarchy. The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost becomes uncanny in precisely this way, in part because in 
one sense it resists categorization in terms of movement, as mentioned, but also because in a 
second sense it resists categorization in terms of animacy.  
To provide clarity on this second sensibility, the ensoulment or investment of animacy, I 
will use an illustrative example. The film Killer Toon (2013) opens with a scene in which a 
webtoon editor, alone in an office building late at night, is attacked and killed by a ghostly 
presence. The sequence begins with a webtoon being opened on the editor’s computer. It is 
presumed that the one who opens the file and begins to scroll through the webtoon is the editor 
herself, until the camera pans up to reveal that she is approaching her desk with a cup of coffee. 
The scrolling itself acts as the initial indicator that there is an animate presence (the ghost) in the 
room with the editor, which is followed thereafter with many more familiar ghostly signifiers: 
lights turning off, strange noises, and so on.  There is of course more to this sequence than the 
opening and scrolling, but importantly it is the scroll itself that acts as the initial signifier that the 
ghost is currently present; when it stops, that presence becomes uncertain. The Killer Toon 
example effectively presents something very similar to the subversion found in The Bongcheon-
Dong Ghost, albeit without both its sudden and shocking jump-scare quality as well as without 
the fact of its images being fused into continuous motion. The webtoon, in Killer Toon, is an 
example of animation “in the broad sense,” becoming invested with agency and ensouled with a 
sense of presence, but not “in the narrow sense,” in that it is still perceived by the woman as a 
sequence of still images. But, importantly, the one doing the animating is not the reader in either 
case, it is some other nonhuman presence: the webtoon itself and the Javascript trigger, or in the 
case of Killer Toon, a ghost. The Javascript in The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost substitutes for the 
ghost in Killer Toon: both afford the perception of their animacy through their interaction with 
the webtoon. The lone signifier of an animate presence is the single act of the scroll, the 
demonstration of the webtoon reading itself.  
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Figure 3 The editor returning to her desk to find the webtoon reading itself in Killer Toon 
 What is evident in the example of Killer Toon is the “construction of alterity” that is 
central to Silvio’s definition of animation. An Other, the ghost, is produced. Again, this is not a 
matter of the projection of the editor alone in the room but rather the experience of the force of a 
nonhuman animator. The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost does this as well, imbuing the webtoon with a 
sense of agency and turning the webtoon itself into an Other that the reader must struggle against, 
one which is uncanny because it is there, and then not: acting, and then not. However, The 
Bongcheon-Dong Ghost also merges the investment of the webtoon with perceivable agency, like 
that which is depicted in Killer Toon, with the transformation of still images into moving images. 
Thus, The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost becomes animated in a doubled sense: as both the 
transformation of stillness into motion as well as the transformation of an “inanimate” object into 
an “animate” actant. However, these senses are layered on to each other as part of a single act of 
perception. The destabilization of the still/moving image binary becomes a matter of an 
inanimate/animate binary. Thus, by virtue of the movement it generates, The Bongcheon-Dong 
Ghost destabilizes its status as inanimate in both “the narrow sense” and “the broad sense”, 
rewriting it into an uncanny space between the binary each sense centers around. This also 
supports and is supported by a linking of the webtoon and the character Mrs. Cho; as Mrs. Cho 
comes to move the webtoon becomes imbued with agency, or vice versa. Mrs. Cho is The 
Bongcheon-Dong Ghost, and The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost is Mrs. Cho. 
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Given that the reader-comic relationship is co-constitutive, it is naturally the case that a 
destabilization of the status of the webtoon as media object invokes a parallel destabilization of 
the classification of the reader themselves. That is, the reader is no longer able to conceive of 
themselves as analogous to a puppeteer. And yet, they are not able to settle into the role of a 
passive viewer either; the destabilization affords a different mode of readership altogether. This 
mode, as unsettling as it may be for the reader to participate in, is geared towards potentials 
rather than to certainty. It is cautious, and it recognizes the agency inherent to the media form as 
it encounters each image, even if that form does not continually demonstrate what it holds the 
potential to do. And while it may be the case that such tension and uncertainty eases up over 
time, as the reader continues to read webtoons that don’t suddenly and shockingly spring to life, 
they can never outright eliminate the possibility that webtoons might move, and that they might 
be moved.  
 Thus, webtoons like The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost afford a mode of interaction that stands 
outside of the presumed relationship between reader and comic, itself predicated on a form of 
animacy hierarchy. Its sudden surge of the uncanny, of categorically uncertain animacy, opens 
onto an “animist” mode of readership that is, unlike the hierarchical ordering of animator-
animation, compatible with it. I characterize this mode as “animist,” primarily due to its emphasis 
on potentials (for movement, for animacy) rather than rigid classification. Though animism is 
frequently defined as the recognition of souls in nonhumans, that also might be broadened to 
refer to a more generalized “animating agency”, as Lamarre puts it.104 Thus, the recognition of 
the potential for animacy, the agency of the webtoon and the potential movement of its images, 
resists animacy hierarchies enabled by a naturalist framework, and buttresses a push towards 
animism. As a result, though also as a result of newfound theoretical interest in animation, 
animism itself has seen a resurgence, which some such as Lamarre have labelled “new 
animism.”105 Given that this is the case, it seems fitting to suggest that the underlying principles 
of something like new animism might be found in the very structures of something like The 
Bongcheon-Dong Ghost.  
 
Conclusion: Lingering Potential 
 
104 Lamarre, “Animation and animism”. 284.  
105 Ibid., 287.  
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In sum, The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost operates as a critical response to a disposition which 
sees the reader as a type of puppeteer, operator, or animator, bringing the comic to life according 
to their will; a disposition which positions the reader as one that projects motion onto the 
otherwise “inanimate” webtoon. The uncanny, animist, destabilizing subversion of The 
Bongcheon-Dong Ghost unfolds across two registers. On the one hand, the status of the image as 
still/moving is destabilized, which transforms the webtoon into something which might spring 
into motion at any moment. At the same time, the status of the webtoon as inanimate/animate is 
destabilized, as the webtoon “brings to life”, ensouls, or animates an animator, the Javascript 
channeled into the image of the ghost. This experience of the material technicity of computational 
forces channeled into the ghostly image overtakes the role the reader themselves presumes to take 
on, nullifying their act of projection and replacing it with a qualitatively different experience of 
animation. This makes the webtoon difficult to categorize within a system that defines media 
objects according to the active reader, operator, or puppeteer, that manipulates them in a 
particular way. It creates a media blur; one that destabilizes both the media form of the webtoon 
and the position of the webtoon reader. This situates the webtoon as not only itself being 
unreceptive to animacy hierarchies, but as more generally, working to destabilize animacy 
hierarchies altogether.  
For this reason, even though The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost continues to be somewhat novel 
to this day, this is not a matter of a single exceptional webtoon or artist. The Bongcheon-Dong 
Ghost merely reveals the already uncanny potential of webtoons as a particular digital media 
format. By virtue of their natively digital architecture, webtoons cannot be reduced to what is 
visible on the surface. To make the takeaway clear, The Bongcheon-Dong Ghost introduces 
webtoons as media form into a project of destabilizing animacy hierarchies. Once The 
Bongcheon-Dong Ghost reveals the potential of the format, it becomes impossible to rule out the 
possibility that any webtoon (especially if it is a horror webtoon) might suddenly spring to life. 
This activates a space wherein the media object and its media environment are always potentially 







 “Filled with Determination”: Animacy Through Temporal Agencies and World 
Divergence in Undertale 
 
“The power to reshape the world… Purely by your own determination. The ability to play 
God! The ability to SAVE.” 
-Flowey, a character from Undertale 
 
I am sitting alone in a dark room in front of a computer screen playing a video game. 
Something strange is happening. The game closed, but I didn’t close it. I double-click the icon on 
my desktop: Undertale. The game’s intro starts to play normally. Suddenly, the screen glitches. I 
am met with the screen where I can load my save file. But it is not mine. Last time I checked it 
was mine, but something happened. Something is happening. And someone, or something, is 
doing it. Something is out of my control, and not simply because I am bad at playing the game. 
At this point, I am not sure I am the one playing the game at all.  
What does it mean to be the “player” of a videogame? What does a player do? What is the 
relationship that a player has to the characters and worlds of videogames? These are questions 
asked by Toby Fox’s meta-fictional Undertale, a game marketed as “the friendly RPG [Role-
Playing Game] where nobody has to die.”106 Undertale released in late 2015. Though it is an 
indie game made primarily by creator Toby Fox in the United States, Undertale is arguably a 
Japanese Role-Playing Game (JRPG). Whether or not JRPGs can be made outside of Japan, or 
whether those games are merely “JRPG-like” remains a point of contention, but for simplicity I 
refer to Undertale as a JRPG here.107 Undertale is directly inspired by 1995’s Earthbound 
(Mother 2 in Japan) and Shin Megami Tensei, which themselves follow in the traditions of series 
such as Dragon Quest and Final Fantasy, all Japanese games that had previously set many of the 
standards and expectations of the genre. Undertale’s wholesome exterior belies its true 
imperative, which is ultimately to deliver a poignant critique of, on the one hand, the structural 
design of the JRPG genre in particular and video games more generally as well as, on the other 
 
106 Undertale Trailer [Video]. Available at: https://store.steampowered.com/app/391540/Undertale/ 
107 For more on this, see Mia Consalvo. “Much Ado about JRPGs: Square Enix and Corporate Creation of 
Videogames”. Atari to Zelda: Japan’s Videogames in Global Contexts. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 2016.  
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hand, the dispositions, attitudes, and function of the player in them. Undertale achieves this not 
simply through its narrative and dialogue, but more importantly in the way that it displaces the 
functional role of the player and their particular agencies, constructing, “bringing to life,” or 
animating an Other that takes on those functions and those agencies.  
One of the many things that makes Undertale truly special however, is that in certain 
ways, it does not act like most videogames. Relying on the conventions of the JRPG, and the 
assumptions that the player is likely to bring with them into the game experience, from something 
as simple as what an acronym (e.g. LV) might stand for to as abstract as to how they should 
understand and treat the NPCs (Non-playable characters) that live in that world, Undertale enacts 
an unsettling of conventional engagement with both the JRPG in particular and videogames more 
broadly. One of the most striking ways that this is achieved is through a mode of presenting 
animacy: qualities of humanness, lifelikeness, awareness, and so on; and to which we might add 
“playerness”, a set of functions thought to constitute the role of the player.  
In this chapter, I detail the way in which Undertale produces, ensouls, or “animates” a 
figure of alterity, an Other. This is achieved through the transfer of a set of roles, functions, or 
types of agency and mobility traditionally thought to be characteristic of the player as a human, 
“living”, animating subject who possesses a greater degree of animacy than the nonhuman, 
“dead” and inanimate fictional characters and worlds that they bring to life.  Building on 
Alexander Galloway’s typology of “operator acts” vs. “machine acts”, I argue that Undertale 
forces a transformation of such a typology by presenting something which blurs the distinction 
between the two types of acts. These two types of roles are in part established through particular 
temporal agencies granted to the player, such as the “save” function, and the subsequent capacity 
to both redo (to reload) and to do things differently. The save mechanic, and the subsequent 
proliferation across divergent worlds that is directly afforded by that same mechanic, are two 
unique agencies thought to be inherent to the player. On this latter agency of divergence, I take a 
somewhat novel approach by presenting this Other as a certain type of kyara within the 
videogame as a condensed “media mix” system. Kyara refers to a type of pre-narrative character 
state typically associated with characters in the media mix and is most generally associated with 
Japan. Framing certain strains of theory of kyara in terms of a mode of agency which involves 
the adoption of divergent roles and the proliferation through divergent worlds, I draw a crucial 
link between ways that both players and characters move across media and worlds. In short, this 
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allows Undertale to produce a sense of kyara which also feels life-like particularly because it acts 
as some reflection of the player themselves. In doing so, Undertale enacts animation through the 
production of an agent, the genesis of another “player” in a particular sense, which challenges the 
human player’s status as both the only player, and as a player at all.  
 
The Player as Animator, Operator, God 
What does the player of a video game do, and in what ways does that role constitute video 
games as such? When it comes to understanding a video game player, one must note that 
understanding both “play” and “games” can be both misleading and incomplete; not all of what 
constitutes either can fully explain the specificity of what it means, and both concepts produce 
implications that don’t necessarily map on to the role of “player”. Much of the characterization of 
video games, and thus of the player, have emerged in the search for some “purity” of video 
games to distinguish them from other media forms such as film and television. Brendan Keogh 
notes that for Alexander Galloway, “this purity is in the centrality of ‘action’ for videogames: 
The player does some-thing.”108 For Galloway, the emphasis on action is constitutive of video 
games as a media form: “video games are action.”109 In Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture, 
Galloway develops a typology of actions to distinguish between the function of the human 
“operator” and the nonhuman “machine,” between which the video game emerges.110 For 
Galloway this typology has four major categories: diegetic and nondiegetic operator acts, and 
diegetic and nondiegetic machine acts.111 Machine acts includes things such as the actions of 
hardware, but also the actions of something like “non-player characters” (NPCs).112 Galloway 
does not privilege one type of action over another, noting the “active participation of operators 
and machines” as well as adding that “[t]he two types of actions are ontologically the same.”113 
Though the two types, operator acts and machine acts, are not substantially different, specific 
 
108 Galloway in Brendan Keogh. "Across Worlds and Bodies: Criticism in the Age of Video Games." Journal of Games 
Criticism 1, no. 1 (2014): 6. Keogh questions this however, stating that “every medium demands an active bodily 
engagement from the audience – a book needs a reader willing to turn pages in the right order no less than a 
videogame requires a player to press buttons at the right time”108. Keogh, “Across Worlds and Bodies”, 8. 
109 Alexander R. Galloway. Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture. Vol. 18. (U of Minnesota Press, 2006), 2. 
110 Galloway initially refers to the “machine” as the “electronic computational device,” though throughout his 
discussion it is evident that “machine acts” describes an assemblage of hardware, software, and things like non-
playable characters. Galloway. Gaming, 1.  
111 Ibid., 38.  
112 Ibid., 12.  
113 Ibid., 2, 5. 
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actions are bound up with one or the other. This is all rather sensible; for instance, machines do 
not generally perform operator acts, such as the diegetic act of moving a character through a level 
or the nondiegetic act of employing cheat codes. One could argue however that Galloway’s 
typology leaves out the possibility for certain kinds of things (i.e. players/machines) to perform 
specific actions.114 Even at face value, the dichotomy is not solely of action (i.e. operator vs. 
operated) but rather maps actions on to categories of things (human = operator, machine = 
operated).  
 Obviously, one cannot blame Galloway’s typology for assuming that it is the player who 
will play, but this structure of categorization is arguably also underpinned by the logic of an 
animacy hierarchy, what Mel Y. Chen calls “an animate hierarchy of possible acts.”115 Chen 
notes that “[a]nimacy hierarchies in Western ontologies are about kind: they assert that this group 
[operator/machine] is affiliated with these properties [different available actions].”116 Here, it is 
telling that Galloway selects the term “operator”, invoking something analogous to a puppet-
operator relationship. Scholars such as Christopher Bolton and Deborah Levitt have suggested 
that the animated film is the successor to the marionette, but Galloway’s typology suggests that 
the videogame is perhaps in more ways a continuation of this puppet-operator relationship.117 For 
Galloway, most nondiegetic machine acts either enable or disable the player, but largely the 
machine’s capacity to act is limited to the degree to which they allow the human action of the 
player to move through them. Nondiegetic operator acts, on the other hand, involve a much 
greater degree of animacy, and a much greater degree of control over the animate status of the 
machine. 
 Galloway’s emblematic example of a what he calls a nondiegetic operator act is the action 
of pausing a game, an act “that sets the entire game into a state of suspended animation.”118 
Pausing is only one of many temporal controls offered to the player, and while such controls are 
 
114 Moreover Galloway suggests, understandably so, that the objectives of operators and machines are distinct. For 
example he notes ““winning Metroid Prime is the operator’s act, but losing it is the machine’s.” The machine 
cannot win Metroid Prime because, after all, it is not an operator. Galloway. Gaming, 5.  
115 Mel Y. Chen. Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect. (Duke University Press, 2012), 
3.  
116 Ibid., 127.  
117 Levitt. The Animatic Apparatus, 41. “The marionette and it’s successor, the animated film…”. Christopher A. 
Bolton. "From Wooden Cyborgs to Celluloid Souls: Mechanical Bodies in Anime and Japanese Puppet 
Theater." Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 10, no. 3 (2002): 729-771. 
 
118 Galloway. Gaming, 12.  
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not unique to videogames, their centrality is certainly amplified when it comes to games. Though 
the worlds of games include, for example, idle animations such as simulated weather (what 
Galloway calls an “ambience act”) which are not necessarily subject to the player’s in-game 
agency, in general the player has unprecedented control over time.119 Liam Mitchell, in 
Ludopolitics, puts it as such:  
 
No other medium claims to offer such comprehensive control over temporality. Saving 
and reloading, dying and respawning, speedrunning or cheating; slowing it down, 
speeding it up, replaying it, pausing it entirely: videogames involve the manipulation of 
time in the service of mapping and mastering digital worlds, and this act of manipulation 
indexes an attitude that extends to the mapping and mastering of the world in general.”120  
 
Some of the operator acts which Mitchell outlines may sound familiar, but in relation to, 
say, video, novels, or comics, a certain set of these stand out as novel, namely, the operator act of 
“saving and reloading” (Galloway refers to both pausing and “loading or saving” as “setup 
actions”).121 Generally speaking, most narrative-driven games involve continual choices that the 
player can make that result in some form of divergence, from the simple divergence of success 
vs. failure to much more complex branching narrative paths. Temporal control in games is not 
just about speed (fast-forwarding) or direction (rewinding) but is also about divergence. Most 
often, videogames present a plural but finite set of narrative possibilities. Thus, the ability to save 
and reload becomes the temporal mechanism by which the player is able to reclaim control over 
these divergences. It might be used simply to “correct” a mistake, to undo a death, but it might 
also be used to “decontextualize” and “recontextualize” a player entirely, allowing them to play a 
different role.122  
Mitchell’s account of the player is crucial, because it links the mode of the player to a 
logic of exhaustion. Mitchell invokes Heidegger’s mode of viewing the world as “standing 
reserve”, wherein that which exists in the world is revealed as “resources” primary available for 
human consumption or use. This particular way of viewing the world forecloses those same 
 
119 Ibid., 10. 
120 Liam Mitchell. Ludopolitics: Videogames Against Control. (John Hunt Publishing, 2018), 16. 
121 Galloway, Gaming, 13. 
122 Shunsuke Nozawa. "Characterization." Semiotic Review 3, 2013: 13. 
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resources from being viewed in alternative ways, for example “as the locus of spiritual practice, 
as an incomprehensible and inhuman wild, or as something that cannot be characterized as some 
thing.”123 For Mitchell, the dominant structures of play invite the player to think of game worlds 
as “dead” standing reserve, to see them first and foremost as means to an end. Notably, this is not 
just true for the virtual objects in the virtual game world, such as virtual forests that can be cut 
down to make virtual lumber, but also for the set of narrative possibilities that exist within the 
game. For Mitchell, players are predominantly conditioned to seek out all the events in the game 
which they might possibly view. If a choice in a game presents branching narrative paths (NPC 
lives vs. NPC dies) they will likely seek to view both of those paths.124 Characters and events are, 
in some sense and to varying degrees, often reduced to “sets of numbers” and “lines of dialogue”, 
and the objective of exhaustion is to see them all.  
To put it somewhat differently, players not only enter into a godlike relationship with the 
virtual world of the game, but they also act as a particular type of god. Mitchell’s claim is 
effectively that the player has a particular relationship to the game world in terms of what Marc 
Steinberg calls incompossibility. In Anime’s Media Mix, Steinberg discusses incompossibility 
with regards to divergent narratives found in the media mix, a system which revolves in part 
around narrative divergence, and is most generally associated with Japan. Though Steinberg’s 
discussion includes, but is not focused on, video games, the system which he discusses traces its 
roots, in part, and perhaps this particular logic most centrally, to both table top role-playing 
games and video games.125 Steinberg notes that Kadokawa Tsuguhiko’s model of the media mix 
was based on his “interest in role-playing games”, and specifically on the idea that “each replay 
will be different.”126 Tellingly, Steinberg notes that when speaking of the multiplication of 
worlds, “Ōtsuka [Eiji] compares this to the logic of a video game, wherein ‘[e]ach individual 
‘play’ using the same video game will offer up a different development depending on the player 
 
123 Mitchell. Ludopolitics, 37 
124 While Mitchell’s analysis primarily centers around games with some degree of finitude, those which can be 
exhausted, it is quite comprehensive within those parameters, which covers a majority of videogames as a form. 
Completely “linear” games with a single ending (e.g. The Last of Us) are not occluded from his view. They are simply 
easier to “exhaust”.  
125 I separate role-playing games here to include games such as Dungeons & Dragons, which are not videogames 
but have had an impact on both videogames and the media mix that cannot be ignored.  
126 Marc Steinberg. Anime's Media Mix: Franchising Toys and Characters in Japan. (U of Minnesota  
Press, 2012), 181. 
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and the game.”127 For these reasons, I characterize the narrative system of the video game as 
operating as a condensed media mix, as adhering to its logic, but on a smaller scale.128 
Steinberg borrows the terms compossibility and incompossibility from Gottfried Leibniz 
to explain how its system of narrative is distinct from that of transmedia storytelling, in which a 
single narrative “unfolds across multiple media platforms, with each text making a distinctive and 
valuable contribution to the whole.”129 In contrast to transmedia narratives in which “the 
presupposition [is that] the whole is singular, and consistent”, the media mix is characterized by 
“the multiplication of narratives and the corresponding multiplication of worlds.”130 
Incompossibility, for Steinberg, is not strictly inconsistency. Steinberg’s defines the two terms as 
follows:  
 
Two persons are said to exist in a compossible or convergent world insofar as a series of 
events in one person’s world matches the other’s. Two persons are said to exist in 
incompossible worlds if within one person’s world events exist which do not exist in the 
other’s.131 
 
Steinberg adds:  
 
Incompossibility – contradictory coexistence – would involve not merely the difference 
between Adam the sinner and Adam the nonsinner, that is, two divergent Adams, but 
would also involve the divergence between an Adam who did not sin and the world in 




127 Ōtsuka in Marc Steinberg. "Condensing the Media Mix: Multiple Possible Worlds in The Tatami 
Galaxy." Canadian Journal of Film Studies 21, no. 2 (2012): 75.  
128 Of course, video games are themselves also nodal points within the media mix, but this is less relevant here for 
my purposes. 
129 Jenkins in Steinberg, “Condensing the media mix”, 74.  
130 Steinberg, “Condensing the media mix”, 74, 75 76. 
131 Ibid., 77.  
132 Steinberg. Anime's Media Mix, 186.  
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Incidentally, the phrasing Steinberg uses is itself very reminiscent of video games, as when 
players retell their different experiences as “my character did x, but your character did y.” The 
divergence of narrative in video games is defined by incompossible worlds. Here, I employ a 
sense of “world” as narrative world (largely consistent with how it is used by Steinberg), in that 
even if they share the same setting and characters, the variation in which “Adam sinned” and 
“Adam did not sin” would be two divergent and incompossible worlds. Steinberg adds that for 
Leibniz, what ensures the existence of a common world is God, the “guarantor” of 
compossibility, or “a world without contradiction.”133 They are “the divine knowledge that 
chooses the best of all possible worlds.”134 This may seem to accurately describe the player at 
first glance. However for Mitchell, the player as god is anything but; rather, their aim is to select 
all worlds: a world in which their Adam sinned and a world in which their Adam did not, a world 
in which “all of the possibles coexist”, or perhaps more accurately a world in which all of the 
possibles exist at some point.135  
Access to these incompossible worlds also affords the player the opportunity to be 
vicariously contextualized, through their player-character, in a number of respective ways, 
particularly in a game like Undertale with a “blank-slate” player-character. This is most 
commonly expressed by the sentiment that “player characters have multiple lives.”136 For 
instance, one might play as a hero who saves other characters, and then begin a new playthrough 
where they play as a villain, and attempt to kill those same characters, inherently changing the 
nature of the player-character. These player-characters, of course, are referred to within video 
game media cultures as “avatars”, a term which highlights the god-like relationship (and thus 
animacy hierarchy) between players and game worlds.137 Whether one primarily associates these 
recontextualizations with the player themselves, or the character they control, largely depends on 
whether one frames control of the character in terms of performance (character as an extension of 
one’s identity), or in terms of animation (character as figure of alterity).138 In either case, what 
 
133 Ibid., 185. 
134 Steinberg. “Condensing the Media Mix”, 77.  
135 Lazzarato in Steinberg, Anime’s Media Mix, 184.  
136 Mitchell. Ludopolitics, 84.  
137 Teri. Silvio Puppets, Gods, and Brands: Theorizing the Age of Animation from Taiwan (University of Hawaii Press), 
47. 
138 See Teri Silvio. “Animation versus Performance”. Puppets, Gods, and Brands: Theorizing the Age of Animation 
from Taiwan (University of Hawaii Press, 2019). 
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this points to is a mode wherein the player exists as some constant behind a series of 
performances/animations. We might liken them to an actor inhabiting different roles, bringing 
multiple characters to life. Put differently, the player is the “meta-narrative nodal point” that sits 
“behind” the continuous “decontextualizations” and “recontextualizations” of the player-
character.139 This relationship of the player to incompossibility is crucial, positioning their 
agency such that they are able to see, remember, and move across incompossible worlds. The 
action of resetting the game affords the player access to mobility across roles, a mobility which 
the non-player characters don’t have similar access to. The game, after all, cannot remember, for 
instance, that the player “sinned”, and so they retain the agency to recontextualize themselves as 
a “non-sinner”.  
In sum, the predominant understanding of the role of the player, or “operator” is that it is 
defined by two types of agency: a multi-directional movement through time, established through 
the capacity to save/reload, and a subsequent movement through worlds, also afforded by that 
same set of temporal controls. As Mitchell notes: “[t]urning back time… is the means the player 
employs to move through the levels [and worlds], as well as the logical extension of that brand of 
totalizing, goal oriented behavior that regards objects, animals, and people as mere things.”140 To 
put it simply, the dominant mode of the player (saving/reloading and an end-goal of exhaustion) 
and the animacy hierarchy of the game (player-as-animate, game-as-inanimate) are co-
constitutive. Mitchell does not characterize games in this way in order to place a particular value 
judgment on them universally; rather, his point is to emphasize that some games can work against 
these tendencies. For Mitchell, the most fruitful subversions of the Heideggerian “standing 
reserve” mode of viewing the world are found in “single player, story-driven games that 
thematize time.”141 Here, I argue one step further: videogames that thematize time can be 
subversive by putting temporal control in the hands of nonhumans to produce animacy, that 
which is denied of the game and its machine by virtue of a dominant temporal relationship. This 
animacy can be understood as systemic, in that it is the game system itself that takes on these 
traits. Moreover, time is crucial to the subversion of this dominant mode of play because it is so 
crucial to building it up. It is through the gifting of a mode of temporal control to the player that 
 
139 Azuma in Steinberg, Anime’s Media Mix, 190. Nozawa, “Characterization”.  
140 Mitchell. Ludopolitics, 96. 
141 Ibid., 55.  
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they are able to view the set of possible narrative sequences in the game world as a resource to be 
deployed towards the end-goal of exhaustion. For Mitchell, as for myself, one of the most 
poignant works to subvert this mode is 2015’s Undertale.   
 
Undertale  
Undertale is a game which both destabilizes and explicitly thematizes the dominant 
relationship that the player has to the game, though those themes are initially somewhat veiled. 
Undertale’s background exposition is simple: humans and monsters once lived peacefully 
together until eventually the two races found themselves at war and monsters were subsequently 
banished to the underground. The unnamed and androgynous player-character, named by the 
player, falls into the underground, which acts as something of a metaphor for the player 
themselves entering into the world of the game (notably, the entire game takes place within the 
underground). The player-character must find their way back up into the human world. To do 
this, they need to acquire seven human “SOULs”, which can be used to cross the barrier back into 
the human world. However, the barrier itself is guarded by Asgore, the king of the monsters, who 
has an intense distaste for humans. The scenario is as evocative of the JRPGs of the late 80s 
(Dragon Quest, Final Fantasy) to mid 90s (Earthbound, Chrono Trigger) as the aesthetics, and 
players familiar with that genre are likely to feel right at home. 
The first character the player meets in Undertale is Flowey, a talking yellow flower that 
offers to aid the player. The player enters into a first-person “battle screen,” again reminiscent of 
Dragon Quest or Earthbound, in which Flowey instructs the player on how things work in the 
world of the monsters. Normally, the player moves around as their avatar, but on this screen they 
are represented by a small red heart-shaped icon, referred to as a SOUL (this and other game 
terms are capitalized in Undertale).142 Flowey teaches the player how to move around in this 
form. Flowey then scatters little white “friendliness pellets”, which he instructs the player to 
collect. The moment the player comes into contact with one of these “friendliness pellets”, their 
HP (hit points – a marker of how close the player-character is to dying/failing) drop to 1; Flowey 
has tricked them. Twisting his face into a menacing grin, Flowey chides the player for their 
naivete. “In this world, it’s kill or be killed!” he declares.  
 




Figure 4 The player's introduction to the character Flowey 
The player is rescued from the demonic Flowey by a graceful and maternal goat-like 
creature named Toriel. Toriel is a personification of the tu-torial (pun very much intended) of the 
game; she quite literally holds the player’s hand throughout many of the first areas. Most 
importantly, she teaches the player how to survive an encounter with a monster in the 
underground; to use the ACT command in various ways (offering a compliment, flirting, etc.) 
until the player can spare the monster by selecting the MERCY command. Eventually, Toriel 
brings the player back to her house, where she offers to care for the player and keep them safe. 
The player, however, conscious of the goal they must reach, will no doubt choose to leave the 
safety offered by Toriel, at which point she will try to stop them from wandering out in the 
dangerous world of monsters. The game heavily suggests that one cannot pass Toriel using the 
ACT or MERCY commands (though in fact this is possible), and so the player is likely to resort 
to using FIGHT. Many players, if not most, kill Toriel, and Flowey reappears to remind the 
player about his philosophy of the world, that in this world, in this game, by virtue of the system 
itself, it’s “kill or be killed”. Cue the title screen: Undertale.  
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Figure 5 The typical appearance of the battle screen in Undertale 
By the end of the tutorial, Flowey has taught the player to kill the monsters, and Toriel 
has taught the player to spare them. Sparing the monsters, however, does not result in gaining 
“EXP” which allows the player to improve their “LV” and become stronger (based on 
convention, players will assume these are acronyms for “experience points” and “level” 
respectively, but as it turns out, they refer instead to “execution points” and “level of 
violence”).143 Thus, the player has been instilled with two diverging ways of viewing the 
monsters that inhabit the game world, either as interaction partners to be befriended, or as 
resources to be killed and consumed in service of becoming stronger and achieving the game’s 
ultimate goal. In other words, they can view them as “dead” resources or as “living” 
communication partners. What the player chooses to do in this regard will impact the ending of 
the game. Though there are a number of meaningful choices that the player can make that can 
impact the ending, such as whether to befriend characters or kill them, there are generally three 
possible endings to Undertale: “neutral”, “true pacifist”, or “genocide”, each of which has minor 
variations. 
Along the way in Undertale, the player will find many “SAVE” points, at which the 
player can record their progress, and from which the player can resume if they happen to die or 
 
143 In a JRPG, “EXP” and “LV” would typically be acronyms for “Experience Points” and “Level”, but it is revealed late 
in Undertale that they in fact refer to “Execution Points” and “Level of Violence” 
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wish to reload. At each SAVE point, a text box appears in which the player is told, in a manner of 
variations, that they are filled with “determination.” At first, these statements are taken to be 
descriptive of the mood of the player-character, who is increasingly filled with courage as they 
progress on their journey. Over the course of the game, however, it is gradually revealed that 
determination is a specific and diegetic force in the world of Undertale. Should they pursue the 
“true pacifist” ending, they will eventually need to explore the “True Lab” of the character Dr. 
Alphys, and here they may stumble upon a journal entry on determination:  
 
"I've done it. Using the blueprints, I've extracted it from the human SOULs. I believe this 
is what gives their SOULs the strength to persist after death. The will to keep living. The 
resolve to change fate. Let's call this power... "Determination"." - Entry Number 5, True 
Lab144 
 
Determination, in Undertale, is “de-termination.”145 It is the human (i.e. the player’s) 
capacity to “persist after death”, to save and reload, to do things over, and to try again. In other 
words, Undertale contextualizes the unique temporal agencies offered to the player within the 
medium of videogames as a part of its world and its narrative. Determination is both diegetic and 
nondiegetic. It is also what constitutes the human as such, as protected by some technology 
which “tends toward the defiance of death through the exercise of control.”146 Determination is 
furthermore what places humans, in the world of Undertale, higher in terms of an animacy 
hierarchy; humans are further away from death itself. And determination itself is also afforded by 
their animacy, by their human “SOUL.”  
 
144 “Determination”. Undertale Wiki.  https://undertale.fandom.com/wiki/Determination 
145 Neither Undertale nor Toby Fox have explicitly stated that this play on words was intentional, but it is widely 
theorized to be the case among fans.  
146 Mitchell. Ludopolitics, 15.  
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Figure 6 A reference to "determination" at the first SAVE point in the game. The message is typical of subsequent SAVE point 
messages. 
At the end of the “neutral” ending of Undertale, the player reaches Asgore, the king of the 
monsters, who has collected six human SOULs and only needs one more, the player’s, in order to 
cross the barrier into the human world. After a fierce battle, the player stands victorious, and is 
able to choose to kill or spare Asgore. The choice is irrelevant; in a surprise twist, Flowey arrives 
to land the killing blow on Asgore. Absorbing the six human SOULs previously in Asgore’s 
possession, Flowey stands as the final challenge to the player. But Flowey, now with human 
SOULs inside him, (i.e. a nonhuman channeling supposedly human characteristics) possesses a 
power that the player has never been challenged by to this point in the game: determination.  
Flowey chastises the player for sparing monsters in the underground along their journey, 
for failing to adhere to his philosophy that in this world, “it’s kill or be killed.” Flowey then does 
something that no player would expect; he closes the game. Assuming the player is playing on a 
computer (the game was only later ported to home and handheld consoles), they will be brought 
back to their desktop and must restart the game. When the player re-opens the game, something is 
amiss: the text and images of the game display improperly, appearing to be a glitch. The player’s 
save file is replaced with Flowey’s save file, who appears to have maximized his LV and the in-
game timer. Should the player load the file, they will find themselves in a completely dark area; if 
they wander north, they will find another SAVE point. When they attempt to SAVE their game, 
the text will state that their SAVE file has been erased. The dialogue box cracks and shatters “as 
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though it is being rammed and the dialogue box exists in the playing world; not just as user 
interface,” revealing a massive Flowey. 147 
 
 
Figure 7 Flowey after he has taken over the player's SAVE FILE 
Tormenting the player, Flowey threatens: “forget about escaping to your old SAVE 
FILE.” The cute Flowey disappears and a monstrous Flowey assembled from photo-realistic 
plant, human and machine parts descends upon the screen, known officially as “Photoshop 
Flowey.” Letting out a maniacal laugh, Flowey begins his assault, against which the player has 
little hope of surviving. At every turn, as the player’s hit points are gradually chipped away, 
Flowey continually saves the game. Should the player fail against Photoshop Flowey, and they 
almost certainly will, a scrolling text box filled with Flowey’s laughter fills the screen and once 
again Flowey closes the game.148   
On the one hand, the action of Flowey closing the game could be construed as a particular 
type of nondiegetic machine act, what Galloway would call “the death act”; the most emblematic 
 
147 “Photoshop Flowey”, Undertale Wiki. https://undertale.fandom.com/wiki/Photoshop_Flowey. 
148 Of note: controls such as the “Esc” function, which would normally allow one to exit the game, do not work 
during this text box sequence. The player is forced to wait for it to end.  
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of which is the “game over.”149 Notably, Galloway also calls the death act “the disabling act”, 
and both terms, “death” and “disabling,” suggest that animacy is also at play.150 However, though 
the death act “[puts] the gamer into a temporary state of disability and submission,” the key word 
here is temporary.151 Players, it seems, are always further away from death itself, they can always 
become “de-terminated”. Yet by removing the capacity for the player to save and reload, Flowey 
returns the player to a state wherein they are once again susceptible to the passage of time and 
ultimately to death, not able to stand outside the flow of time and manipulate the passage of time 
for those within it. As Mitchell states, “the passage of time is the most immediate index of our 
fundamental lack of control.”152  
On the other hand, the statement “Flowey closes the game” does not necessarily need to 
be, within Galloway’s typology, framed as a either a nondiegetic act, nor as a machine act. The 
game makes it abundantly clear that Flowey is not just misbehaving as inanimate object, but 
rather is also behaving correctly as a player: saving and reloading, maximizing stats, exerting 
temporal control.153  Flowey continually performs operator acts. Flowey resists the logic of 
operator vs. machine, because he is in fact a nonhuman player character. And by virtue of being 
an operator, demonstrative of the agencies that constitute such a role, Flowey also becomes more 
animate. Flowey has taken the form of agency known in Undertale as “determination”, and in 
doing so, has become the player themselves. Agency itself, Undertale reveals, becomes mobile. 
Photoshop Flowey’s visual design conveys the complexity of the amalgamation that Flowey has 
become. Its plant-like features signify Flowey as the character within the game. Its human-like 
features signal the human function of determination/player which it has absorbed. Its machine-
like features signal that it is the game itself: Photoshop Flowey is Undertale. 
 
149 Galloway. Gaming, 28, 31.  
150 Ibid., 31. 
151 Galloway. Gaming, 31. 
152 Mitchell. Ludopolitics, 54.  
153 Galloway does make a reference to a game “playing itself,” but it is in reference to what he calls an “ambience 
act” (e.g. simulated weather). It thus refers more to a game playing itself as if it were another media form entirely 




Figure 8 Photoshop Flowey, which is stylistically different from anything else seen in Undertale 
So long as the player stays determined (both by staying motivated and by continuing to 
play), they can emerge victorious against Photoshop Flowey, as eventually the SOULs of the 
other six humans will come to the player’s aid. Defeating Flowey leads to the end of the game, 
but Flowey hints that the player could use their SAVE file to achieve a better ending. This is 
where things really begin. If the player does any investigation, they will easily learn that 
Undertale has multiple endings, one of which is labelled the “true pacifist” ending. Given that 
Undertale is a relatively short game, clocking in at roughly 4-5 hours (JRPGs often span 20-70 
hour adventures), they will likely be motivated to begin again and achieve this ending, sparing 
every creature over the course of the game and meeting certain other criteria. The design of 
Undertale, as well as hints offered by the neutral ending, push the player to seek out a better 
ending, or at least a very different one.  
At the risk of some over-explanation which delves into the convoluted, I wish to detail 
what lore is revealed in these two additional endings, as it is highly revealing of how Undertale 
thematizes the temporal agencies attributed to the player. For the sake of ease, I will make the 
takeaway clear at the onset: a separate entity, unbeknownst to the player, is “animating” Flowey. 
In the “true pacifist” ending, the player will learn that Flowey’s true identity was that of Asriel, 
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the son of King Asgore and Toriel. Asriel, because he was a monster, was killed by humans, 
which sparked the hatred that King Asgore carried for them, and which motivates him to impede 
the player-character’s progress. Asriel perished in a field of golden flowers, and when Dr. Alphys 
experimented with infusing one of these flowers with “determination,” Asriel was subsequently 
reanimated in his new floral form. The posthumous Asriel becomes Flowey. 
But Flowey is not only Asriel, something which is revealed if the player achieves the final 
ending, the “genocide” ending. If the player attempts to start another new game after achieving 
the “true pacifist” ending, Flowey speaks directly to the player. He tells the player that all of their 
friends are now safe, and that the only threat remaining to them is the player themselves, who has 
the power to reset everything. Against the protests of Flowey, the player may choose to seek out 
the “genocide” ending, in which they must meticulously kill every monster in the underground 
until they reach maximum LV. At the end of the “true pacifist” ending, Asriel recognizes that the 
player’s avatar is an individual distinct from the player themselves. Asriel asks the avatar what 
their name is, and subsequently learns that their name is Frisk, not the name given by the player 
at the start of the game. The “genocide” ending reveals that the character the player actually 
named when they began the game was the first human to fall into the underground, who in the 
game’s files is known as Chara. The player only meets Chara at the very end of the “genocide” 
playthrough. In its eerie final screens, they deliver to the player this message:  
 
Greetings. I am Chara. Thank you. Your power awakened me from death. My “human 
soul”. My “determination”. They were not mine, but YOURS. At first, I was so confused. 
Our plan had failed, hadn’t it? Why was I brought back to life? You. With your guidance. 
I realized the purpose of my reincarnation. Power. Together, we eradicated the enemy 
and became strong. HP. ATK. DEF. GOLD. EXP. LV. Every time a number increases, 
that feeling… that’s me. ‘Chara’. Now. Now we have reached the absolute. There is 
nothing left for us here. Let us erase this pointless world, and move on to the next.”  
 
Chara is a distinct character within the narrative of Undertale but also extracts and embodies the 
function of the player: possessing a “human soul” and “determination”, motivated by reaching 
“the absolute” (i.e. achieving exhaustion), and also initially being connected to the player in some 
way. In the game’s lore, when Chara fell into the underground, they were adopted by Asriel and 
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his family. Eventually, Chara became sick, and their only wish before their death was to see the 
golden flowers of their village on the surface. Absorbing Chara’s SOUL, a Chara-controlled 
Asriel carried Chara’s body back into the human world, leading to the event in which Asriel died. 
In sum, Flowey was in fact a reincarnated Asriel ensouled by Chara: a nonhuman monster 
ensouled by a human animating force within, a force which enables and compels him, both 
diegetically and nondiegetically, to act like a player. Flowey narrates this process in which he 
gradually becomes the type of player Mitchell describes, one motivated by exhaustion:  
 
But as I left this mortal coil… I started to feel apprehensive. If you don’t have a SOUL, 
what happens when you…? Something primal started to burn inside me. “No,” I thought. 
“I don’t want to die!”… Then I woke up. Like it was all a bad dream. I was back at the 
garden. Back at my “save point.” Interested, I decided to experiment. Again and again, I 
brought myself to the edge of death. At any point, I could have let this world continue on 
without me. But as long as I was determined to live… I could go back. Amazing isn’t it 
<Name>? I was amazed too. At first, I used my powers for good. I became “friends” with 
everyone. I solved all their problems flawlessly. Their companionship was amusing… For 
a while. As time repeated, people proved themselves predictable. What would this person 
say if I gave them this? What would they do if I said this to them? Once you know the 
answer, that’s it. That’s all they are. It all started because I was curious. Curious what 
would happen if I killed them. “I don’t like this,” I told myself. “I’m just doing this 
because I HAVE to know what happens.” Ha ha ha… What an excuse! You of all people 
must know how liberating it is to act this way.[…]You understand, <Name>. I’ve done 
everything this world has to offer. I’ve read every book. I’ve burned every book. I’ve won 
every game. I’ve lost every game. I’ve appeased everyone. I’ve killed everyone. Sets of 
numbers… Lines of dialogue… I’ve seen them all.”  
 
Flowey’s speech mirrors that of the player themselves, who after “[solving] all their 
problems flawlessly” (the true pacifist ending) eventually becomes motivated by exhaustion and 
“[c]urious what would happen if [they] killed them.” What is noteworthy in Flowey’s speech is 
the emphasis on artificiality, and thus on animacy, that is at play. Once Flowey recognizes a 
particular animating force existent within himself and absent within other inhabitants of his 
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world, he is able to justify his manipulation of them because they are merely numbers, or merely 
dialogue, that’s “all they are.” This is the result of Flowey being animated by Chara.  
Undertale knows that players are likely to achieve each of its endings in a particular 
order: “neutral”, “true pacifist” and then “genocide”. As most players will recognize that they are 
playing a JRPG, where killing monsters is central, they will likely first achieve the “netural” 
ending, having killed at least some monsters, even if they quickly recognize the game’s “point”. 
Because the “true pacifist” ending is the only truly happy ending, and because it is only a slightly 
longer time investment than neutral with much in terms of narrative rewards, the game will most 
likely convince its player to achieve it next. However, the “genocide” ending is extremely 
meticulous, empty, long, difficult, and even boring. The only motivation for pursuing the 
“genocide” ending, against all of the ways that the game discourages it, is the promise of some 
small amount of narrative divergence, the knowledge that the game has not been entirely 
exhausted yet. The player who seeks out a “true pacifist” ending might in fact be Leibniz’s God: 
they recognize that a “better” world exists, and they seek it. The player who continues on to 
obtain the “genocide” ending is not motivated by compossibility but by exhaustion. They are a 
different god. They are Chara.  
At the end of the “genocide” ending, Chara asks the player if they would like to erase the 
world. If the player refuses, Chara asks the player why they ever thought they were in control and 
erases the world anyway, closing the game yet again. If the player re-opens the game, they are 
faced with nothing but a black screen, representing the world they have destroyed, and nothing 
will change for a lengthy ten minutes. Should they wait long enough, Chara will offer to restore 
the world, but only in exchange for the player’s SOUL.  
Most players would feel inclined to stop playing Undertale at this time, as exhaustion has 
seemingly been achieved, but if they decide to play again, something quite interesting happens. 
Even if the player resets their save file, the game remembers that the player sold their SOUL to 
Asriel. As a result, subsequent playthroughs in which the player tries once again to complete a 
“true pacifist” playthrough are permanently altered, leading to what fans have dubbed the 
“soulless true pacifist” ending. This ending is nearly identical to the previous “true pacifist” 
ending, save one critical difference. In the final moments of the game, Chara will briefly appear 
in place of Frisk, indicating that Chara has been in control the whole time, and signaling further 
that they may continue on to the “genocide” playthrough, their very presence spelling out an 
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irreversibly morbid end for the game’s NPCs.   
 In fact, this is only the most extreme example of the many ways in which Undertale 
retains memory, or meta-knowledge, of the player’s actions between playthroughs. As another 
example, should the player exit and reload after having killed Toriel in the introduction of the 
game in order to spare her, Flowey retains the meta-knowledge of when the player killed her: 
 
 I know what you did. You murdered her. And then you went back, because you regretted  
it. Ha ha ha ha… You naïve idiot. Do you think you are the only one with that power?  
The power to reshape the world… Purely by your own determination. The ability to play  
God! The ability to “SAVE.” 
 
One might say that Chara as a character embodies the memory Undertale retains that the 
player cannot erase: a matter of, in the words of Galloway, “[incorporating] this nondiegetic force 
into the story line.”154 The player who completes a “genocide” run of Undertale is forever 
haunted in any subsequent run by a Chara that retains the meta-knowledge of what the player has 
done (i.e. that they have completed the “genocide” playthrough). Moreover, once Chara is 
“activated”, they too move across worlds as an entity which precedes and participates in the 
narrative each time it is reset, retaining the meta-knowledge of what has come before, just like 
the player has done previously. Chara thus also embodies the movement through time and 
movement through worlds that, supposedly, characterizes the player. Those agencies become 
mobile and shift from the player to Chara, as well as to Undertale itself. The character replaces 
the player as a player, as an operator, as a god. 
 
Chara and kyara  
In the Japanese translation of Undertale, the name of the character Chara is translated as 
kyara (キャラ). In Japanese, kyara is a contraction of kyarakutaa (character). But the two terms 
also have nuanced differences, with kyara being deeply associated with a particular type of 
mobility.155 Considering this, Chara turns out to be quite aptly named, given how Chara is used 
 
154 Galloway. Gaming, 33.  
155 These nuanced differences have developed over time. Initially, “the short form kyara was […] just owed to ‘the 
most recent abbreviation fashion’”, but it has now “assumed rather unique connotations and meanings”. Aihara 
2007: 121; in Lukas RA Wilde. "Kyara revisited: The Pre-narrative Character-state of Japanese Character  
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within Undertale. Kyara is understood in a number of ways. At times the central features of 
kyara are thought to be a matter of visual design, an example of which being what Debra Occhi 
calls “wobbly aesthetics.”156 More often however, kyara indexes some portability across media. 
Natsume Fusanosuke argues that “kyara appear as they do because they are designed to be 
mobile across media, time, and space, which allows them to be used for many purposes.”157 
Shunsuke Nozawa adds: Kyara are “fantastic beings – appearing here, reappearing there.”158 
Kyara are not just animate in the sense of “their animation on the screen” but more importantly in 
terms of “their portability across the media mix, their ‘movement in society’.”159 However, a 
number of descriptions of kyara point further to a sense of animacy. Debra Occhi, as one of these 
examples, notes that “Kyara are animated as in they embody [in the words of Teri Silvio] 
‘qualities perceived as human – life, power, agency, will, personality, and so on.”160 In sum, 
setting aside visual design, kyara are constituted in part by a particular agency, the ability to 
move across media and worlds. Notably, this is quite similar to the way in which the player, and 
subsequently Chara, moves across incompossible worlds. And as a result of this agency and this 
movement, kyara are suggestive of life, they are perceived as relatively more animate.  
The concept of kyara is generally considered to originate with Ito Gō, who expresses a 
similar sentiment to that of Occhi, noting of kyara that they also produce a heightened sense of 
animacy, what he characterizes as a “life force” and a “presence.”161 This way in which kyara 
exist in the world is directly informed by the media mix in general, and incompossible worlds in 
particular. Itō notes that “the essence of the distinction between kyarakutā and kyara is based on 
the imagination of possible worlds.”162 In reference to Hello Kitty, one of the most popular kyara 
worldwide, Lukas RA Wilde refers to that phenomenon as such: “as if there was a 
decontextualized entity ‘behind’ all her contextualized instances.”163 Thomas Lamarre says that 
 
Theory." Frontiers of Narrative Studies 5, no. 2 ,2019, 222. 
156Debra J. Occhi. "Wobbly Aesthetics, Performance, and Message: Comparing Japanese Kyara with their 
Anthropomorphic Forebears." Asian Ethnology 71, no. 1 (2012): 109. 
157 Fusanosuke in Sandra Annett. "What Can a Vocaloid Do? The Kyara as Body without Organs." Mechademia 10 
(2015): 170.  
158 Nozawa. “Characterization”, 8.  
159 Nozawa in Paul Manning and Ilana Gershon. "Animating Interaction." HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 3, no. 
3 (2013): 115.  
160 Silvio 2010, 427 in Occhi, “Wobbly aesthetics, performance, and message”, 111.  
161 Itō in Wilde. “Kyara revisited”, 242.  
162 Itō Gō in Wilde. “Kyara revisited”, 229. Emphasis not present in original. 
163 Wilde. “Kyara revisited”, 224.  
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for Itō, this implies that kyara are “ontologically prior to kyarakutaa.”164 Nozawa expresses a 
similar sentiment, thinking of kyara as “creatures of in-between-ness”, another way of saying that 
they extend beyond their individual incarnations.165 The sensibility is that, like a celebrity who is 
most often only experienced in some role, there is the presumption that if a kyara can inhabit a 
plurality of roles, there must be an existence which is a priori any particular role. This is palpable 
in the “soulless true pacifist” ending, in which Frisk turns out to be operated by Chara for the 
duration of the game; it is as if Chara has finished playing the role of Frisk. Frisk is a kyarakutaa 
to Chara’s kyara. Of course, this is also quite similar to the player as they exist “behind” the 
avatar they control.   
In many ways then, there is a sense that something is “behind” a kyara in the same way 
that the player themselves are “behind” any role they play in the game. That is, both function as 
some form of what Azuma calls a “meta-narrative nodal point.”166 If it is not yet apparent, both 
the player and kyara bear a similar relationship to incompossible worlds. Both possess a 
particular mobility which affords them the potential to move across and call into being 
incompossible worlds wherein they adopt diverging roles. Just as players have access to multiple 
character lives, Azuma notes that “if we can imagine the existence of multiple lives, we have a 
kyara.”167 Unlike the media mix however, the player tends to presume that they are in control of 
the way in which these worlds are brought to life. What typically holds the media mix together is 
not any singular authorial body, but rather the function of character. As Steinberg puts it: “the 
character takes the place of Leibniz’s God.”168 Thus, it stands to reason that if kyara are largely 
defined by the media mix, and that, as stated above, the videogame both serves as model and 
condensation of the media mix, that something which is mobile across the divergent worlds 
within a single videogame might also take on many of the same properties, and operate on the 
same logic, as kyara.  
Sandra Annett, in her essay on Hatsune Miku and other “vocaloids”, frames kyara not in 
terms of what they are, but what they do.169 Taking a Deleuzian approach, she positions kyara 
 
164 Thomas Lamarre. "Speciesism, Part III: Neoteny and the Politics of Life." Mechademia 6, no. 1 (2011): 129.  
165 Nozawa, “Characterization”, 8. 
166 Azuma in Steinberg. Anime’s Media Mix, 190. 
167 Azuma in Wilde. “Kyara revisited”, 229.  
168 Steinberg. Anime’s Media Mix, 188. 
169 Annett. “What can a Vocaloid do?”, 168. “But instead, let us take Deleuze and Guattari’s approach and ask, 
What do kyara do? How are they fabricated? What comes to pass?” 
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within the framework of the “Body Without Organs.” She thinks of kyara as “surfaces that 
facilitate the play of desire”, but what is central to her analysis is the conceptual challenges 
involved in pinning down kyara.170 That is to say that much like Deleuze describes affect, one 
cannot possess kyara, but is traversed by kyara. Annett thinks kyara not as a quality a body 
possesses, and thus not as a matter of ontology, but rather as a matter of process. For Annett, this 
is about “becoming-kyara.”171 Chara of course fits the description of a character imbued with 
kyara-ness, but they are also something of a personification of kyara-as-affect in this sense. 
Chara moves through bodies just as kyara does, first linked to the player, and then inhabiting and 
animating Flowey from within, enabling him to act as the player previously had.  
Undertale’s formulation then is this: Chara/kyara is a particular agency or mobility which 
affords the movement across incompossible worlds. Chara/kyara as agency is thought to be 
possessed by the player, who can move both themselves and others across worlds and into 
different roles. In Undertale, this agency becomes a tense site of negotiation, as it is contested 
between the player and the nonhuman character. In both the movement and meta-knowledge of 
Chara, as well as the encounter with Flowey/Photoshop Flowey, the player experiences this 
agency as it moves from them to a nonhuman participant who is not themselves, an Other. The  
game, naturally, occludes most visual representation of its computation outside of the save 
mechanic and the divergent worlds which it is capable of producing. Due to this, though the 
agency is a computational force - the memory of the system - this participant is experienced only 
as the characters whom that agency is channeled into, Chara and Flowey. As a result, the agency 
of the character (Chara/Flowey), of the game (Undertale) and of the system (memory) all blur 
together, becoming indistinguishable from one another.  
In sum, the player traditionally acts in a way that is somewhat analogous to kyara, 
through a process of contextualization (Frisk is a non-sinner), decontextualization (reset game), 
and recontextualization (Frisk is a sinner). In Undertale, that dominant mode is externalized as 
Chara, a nonhuman other which proliferates across the worlds that the player calls into being and 
is not subject to the decontextualization of the human player. The kyara function subsequently 
becomes unavailable to the player, as any post-genocide playthrough forecloses the mobility of 
the player across social roles, as it is now Chara that operates different versions of Frisk across 
 
170 Ibid., 169. 
171 Ibid., 170. 
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divergent worlds. Chara’s (and Flowey’s) mobility supersedes that of the player, enacting a 
subversion of animacy hierarchies. The result is twofold: on the one hand, Chara/ Flowey as 
recontextualized entity becomes increasingly mobile through worlds, but on the other hand, 
divergence itself becomes flattened, such that all mobility across worlds can be framed as an 
interaction between the player and an equally animate kyara “behind” all instances of those 
worlds. 
 
Conclusion: Machine Operator Acts 
Galloway’s typology of video game action categorizes a majority of actions and processes 
occurring in games, while also giving due attention to the importance of machine action to the 
medium. Nonetheless, it does not account for instances in which the operator, the player, is the 
machine itself. It would have been difficult to foresee the emerge of the particular actions taken 
by Undertale, actions which destabilize the binary of operator vs. machine. Undertale 
demonstrates the mobility of agency itself, such that those agencies thought to be inherent to the 
human operator are transferred to and demonstrated by the nonhuman machine. “Non-player 
character” ceases to be an apt description of the character Flowey, as he continually behaves like, 
and performs actions seemingly exclusive to, the player. With some additions, Galloway’s 
typology could accommodate this; I would propose to refer to these types of actions as “machine 
operator acts”. What this would reveal, however, is that the machine/operator binary must be 
further broken up: into human vs. machine, and operator vs. operated, with the possibility for all 
combinations being recognized.  
Moreover, Chara both thematizes and embodies a particular role comprised of two 
intertwined agencies, a specific temporal agency (saving/reloading) and the subsequent 
affordance to facilitate a divergence of worlds, characters and roles (kyara). Chara/kyara is 
presumed to be the specifically human function that places the player higher in terms of an 
animacy hierarchy than both the media object they interact with (Undertale) and its elements 
(characters/worlds). The construction of the player in this way, in the case of the “normal” game 
and dominant player-game relationship, arguably produces a mode of viewing the virtual world 
as “standing reserve”, wherein all incompossible worlds and characters become “mere things” to 
be consumed and discarded. Undertale’s meta-fictional narrative, through Chara, extracts this 
role, separating it into its constitutive components and relocating it in the nonhuman assemblage 
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of Undertale/Flowey/Chara. Undertale does not just establish a competing player, but rather an 
Other which competes for the role of player-as-god. This Other, through its demonstrated 
proliferation across worlds, subverts the presumed animacy hierarchy as it signals something 
beyond or “behind” the text that a player who seeks to “bring to life” all incompossibles to a 
point of exhaustion cannot ultimately “possess.”  
In the words of Galloway, “[v]ideo games render social realities into playable form.”172 If 
this is the case, if video games are an index of some broader way of viewing the world and that 
which is in the world – generally as “dead” and primarily available for human needs – then 
something like Undertale can implicitly carry certain philosophical and political themes, by 
positioning itself against views of the world as “standing reserve.” Through projecting a certain 
animacy, something which acts much like the player themselves, Undertale can make highly 
visible the often-naturalized mode of play that relies on a rejection of that same animacy. In 
doing so, it can open up and imagine new possibilities for interaction, that might do some work to 


















172 Galloway. Gaming, 17. 
 66 
Chapter Three 
“Just Monika”: Destabilizing Database Consumption in Doki Doki Literature Club 
 
“An exception has occurred.”  
“File ‘game/script-ch5.rpy’, line 307 
See traceback.txt for details.”  
 
The screen is filled with grainy static. The background scenery is replaced with nothing 
but the above message. I wonder what it means. What I thought was just a standard bishōjo game 
has taken a gut-wrenching dark turn. A central character has died, and the protagonist looks on in 
horror. But then, much stranger things begin to occur.  I exit the game and navigate to the folder 
located on my computer containing the game’s files, looking for a file which would detail the 
error report. There it is, where it had not been before: “traceback.txt.” I open the file. There is 
nothing but lines of code that are incomprehensible to me. I scroll down, and back up, and then I 
see it. A message:  
 
“Oh jeez… I didn’t break anything, did I? Hold on a sec, I can probably fix this… I 
think… Actually, you know what? This would probably be a lot easier if I just deleted her. 
She’s the one who’s making this so difficult. Ahaha! Well, here goes nothing.” 
 
In this space that is both part of the game and external to it, I am experiencing something 
else’s agency. This thing – I assume it’s a character – can write files, rewrite files, and delete 
files. And yet, this space, of files and folders, should be a space that I, as the player, control. 
Sure, maybe I am not tech savvy enough to do what it is I want to do, but in theory only I am the 
one who should be able to fix it, to manipulate the system to produce the artificial drama that I 
consume. And yet, how artificial can I really say this drama and these characters are when they 
themselves can reach outside its boundaries in order to actively construct it? This unsettling of 
my own agency as player, and of the boundary between fiction and reality, is the central 
performance of the bishōjo game Doki Doki Literature Club.  
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Doki Doki Literature Club (henceforth abbreviated as DDLC), is a metafictional bishōjo 
game (beautiful girl game) released in 2017 for Windows and Mac OSX.173 It was created by 
Team Salvato, led by American game designer Dan Salvato. DDLC is most visually similar to 
Japanese visual novels such as Clannad (2004) and Fate/Stay Night (2004): a first-person 
perspective, alternating character poses on static backgrounds, and a bishōjo (beautiful girl) game 
aesthetic.174 There are a variety of names for these types of games: visual novels, novel games, 
dating sims, bishōjo games (or otome/bishōnen games, which often feature beautiful men/boys 
and are primarily marketed towards women) each of which carry their own specific nuances. 
Here I will employ the term bishōjo game, as it emphasizes conventions shared with anime and 
manga that are present in DDLC. The game was released at a time when low budget bishōjo 
games produced outside of Japan were able to take advantage of the increasingly accessible 
publishing tools available on platforms such as Steam. Many of these games make an effort to 
emulate certain bishōjo anime and game tropes that have come to define the genre, often also 
adopting a Japanese high school setting. DDLC follows suit while also pushing that envelope in a 
parodic nature; though it was not initially released in Japan, DDLC presents itself as a translated 
Japanese bishōjo game.175 This becomes explicit at one point in the narrative when the characters 
note that a pun made by one of them “makes no sense in translation.”176 
Using the abundance of Japanese-style bishōjo games available on Steam as camouflage, 
DDLC in fact smuggles in something much darker than its generic signifiers would suggest. 
DDLC turns out to be a subversive psychological horror experience, in which the game, itself 
 
173 What are known as bishōjo games domestically are often known as “dating sims” outside Japan. See Patrick W. 
Galbraith. "Bishojo games: 'Techno-Intimacy' and the virtually human in Japan." international journal 11 (2). 2011. 
It is also worth noting that defining dating sims as games is complicated, as they at times feature incredibly minimal 
interaction. Emily Taylor notes that they might rather be called interactive anime/manga.  Emily Taylor. “Dating-
simulation games: Leisure and Gaming of Japanese Youth Culture.” Southeast Review of Asian Studies 29 (2007), 
198. 
174 It is worth noting that the most direct sources of inspiration for DDLC were games with certain psychological 
horror elements, such as Yume Nikki (2004) and Eversion (2008) and not bishōjo games themselves. Reddit AMA 
with Dan Salvato: “DDLC was mostly influenced by non-VN games, such as Yume Nikki and Eversion. I’ve played 
Tsukihime, Fate/Stay Night, Steins;Gate, 999, and portions of other games like Umineko, Clannad, and some 
others.” Accessed at: 
https://www.reddit.com/r/DDLC/comments/7dvb70/hello_my_name_is_dan_salvato_i_created_doki_doki/ 
175 This is deliberate. In response to u/Gamecrashed during an AMA on Reddit, Salvato comments “Yes, it was 
deliberately written to sound like a translated visual novel” 
176 In the sequence, Natsuki makes a pun based on the name of the character Monika in which the crux of the joke 
relies on the term ika, which in Japanese means “squid”. Monika comments, saying both that her name is not 
pronounced that way, and that the joke makes no sense in translation.  
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part of the fictional narrative, begins to break down. In an interview for Siliconera, Salvato notes 
that “DDLC is not supposed to be a horror game. The whole idea is that it’s a normal dating sim 
game where things go wrong once you start playing it.”177 For practical purposes, I will 
henceforth refer to what Salvato calls the “normal dating sim” as the game, and the “things 
[going] wrong” as the metagame. This generic normality of the game is reflected in the 
promotional materials for DDLC, such as its download page, which never present it as a horror 
game because within the fiction, it isn’t one. The only indication that it will not adhere to the 
genre it presents itself as is a content disclaimer before the title screen of the game for those who 
are easily disturbed, something which would be generally unnecessary for a game of its variety.   
The “game” DDLC is a bishōjo game in which a male protagonist is asked to join a high 
school literature club with four other members, all of whom are female, and three of whom can 
be romanced throughout the course of the game. The main events of the metagame DDLC 
revolve around the remaining female character, the club president of the literature club, Monika. 
In the first act of the game, Monika has an “epiphany.”178 Monika becomes self-aware. This is 
revealed gradually over the course of the game, with more subtle dialogue hints (“tell me you can 
hear me”) eventually evolving into unambiguous fourth wall breaks (“You do know I’m aware 
that this is all a game, right?”). She recognizes that she is a two-dimensional character looking 
out into the three-dimensional world of humans, that her “friends” in the game are not sentient, 
and most importantly that she is the only one of the four non-playable characters in the game that 
is not a romantic option for the player – “No matter how many times you play. It’s all the same.” 
Monika finds herself doomed to live in a world that systematically prevents her from having a 
meaningful connection to what she perceives as the only other person in it. DDLC then follows 
what Deborah Levitt would call Monika’s “Pinocchio narrative” in which over the course of the 
remaining acts, Monika attempts to become more “human.”179 Monika, having fallen in love with 
not the player-character, but the player themselves – the only other entity she can see with 
awareness that resembles hers – attempts to reprogram the game so that the player will want to 
spend time with her. An in-game poem of Monika’s has her preparing to “brandish [her] pen.” 
 
177 Alistair Wong. “Doki Doki Literature Club! Developers Talk About the Horror Of Losing Control”. [Interview]. 
Siliconera. https://www.siliconera.com/doki-doki-literature-club-developers-talk-horror-losing-control/ 
178 Monika: “I guess you could say that I had some kind of epiphany recently.” 
179 Deborah Levitt. The Animatic Apparatus: Animation, Vitality, and the Futures of the Image. (John Hunt 
Publishing, 2018), 33.  
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This takes on a double meaning, as she will try to reach the player through poetry (i.e. through 
the narrative) while also writing and rewriting code to reach the player in a different way 
(through the system). Monika is a writer in two senses: she is a poet, and she is a programmer.  
In this chapter, I analyze the way in which DDLC, through the use of the character 
Monika, destabilizes a paradigm in which players of bishōjo games exercise control over the 
contents of the game (i.e. the girls) as a result of their comprehension of the system. Here, I 
characterize the typical player, whom DDLC anticipates, according to Azuma Hiroki’s 
postmodern theory of otaku (roughly analogous to geek or nerd) who obtain agency by 
reassembling the elements of systems according to their will. In what follows, I detail how DDLC 
subverts such a paradigm of control, by transferring the capacity to reassemble elements from the 
human player to the nonhuman character of Monika. Inseparable from the subversion and 
relocation of agency, DDLC also stages an uncanny “character encounter” that brings a parallel 
set of animacy relations into play. By employing such an encounter that destabilizes the divide 
between reality and fiction, DDLC threatens the “recognition of artificiality” that makes the 
agency of the player (Azuma’s otaku) possible. At the end of the chapter, I argue that this 
animacy is afforded through the channeling of computing into the character image, what I call a 
“computational-animist” force, drawing off of the work of Thomas Lamarre. In sum, I argue that 
DDLC employs a narrative that subverts the logics of agency and animacy conceptualized by 
Azuma and embodied by Azuma’s player, culminating in an immanent critique of these logics. 
DDLC thus acts as a challenge to Azuma’s attribution of agency to the player, by foregrounding 
the agency of the system as it channeled into the animation of the character Monika; in doing so, 
in foregrounding the materiality of DDLC as software, DDLC’s uncanny effect bleeds into all 
software games, any of which can enact a similar agency at any time.   
Often, DDLC is characterized as a subversion of the bishōjo game and genre, but is 
generally considered within, at times, a strictly representational logic. This logic recognizes that 
DDLC purposefully arranges itself as generic in order to make some claim, but perhaps adds that 
it fails to do so. It is certainly true on some level that DDLC can be read as genre parody; no 
doubt the game offers some commentary on the implausible bishōjo anime/video game generic 
structure in which every female character falls effortlessly in love with an often characteristically 
unlikeable male protagonist. However, an analysis of DDLC that confines itself to a 
representational logic might reduce what DDLC acts as a critique of, missing how DDLC offers a 
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broader immanent critique of the relationship between users, operators, consumers, or what I 
refer to throughout this thesis as “animators” and the contents (characters, images, narratives) that 
they manipulate and consume. This relationship is mapped onto a representational gender 
dynamic but cannot be wholly subsumed by it.180 The game suggests that this is the case: as 
Monika herself puts it: “Sometimes asking what a poem [what becomes the game’s allegory for 
an artificial simulacra] is about isn’t the right question.”181 That is, the “right question” might be 
instead what a poem can do. Furthermore, Monika makes a clear distinction between humans and 
characters that inhabit different dimensions when she nearly lets her secret slip in Act 1 by noting 
that “humans are not two-dimensional creatures” (she corrects herself to say “one-dimensional”). 
Thus, an analysis of DDLC should, as mine will here, attempt to address the play of forces that 
cannot entirely be coded.  
 
Double-Layer Consumption and the Agency of the Player 
In the previous chapter, I established that the player of a video game can be conceived 
predominantly as a particular type of animator, with a god-like relationship to the virtual 
environment in which they bring to life a finite set of diverging narrative sequences. This 
involves a positioning of the contents of the game (characters, narrative, world) as a 
Heideggerian standing reserve to be deployed towards some end-goal, most often the goal of 
exhaustion. However, this relationship is further complicated by the fact that players have a 
layered understanding of the game, as both coding (what is presented) and code (information). 
That is, digital games are combinations of text, images, narrative, characters, and world, but are 
also bundles of data, algorithms, and code. Or, in other words, as Alexander Galloway puts it: 
“[v]ideo games are games, yes, but more importantly they are software systems; this must always 
remain in the forefront of one’s analysis.”182 Often, understanding the game on both of these 
 
180 It’s worth pointing out that Salvato is not motivated by a disdain for the visual novel, though that doesn’t mean 
it could not still be read as criticism. However, during his Reddit AMA, Salvato answers the question “why a visual 
novel?” with “I love visual novels and I’ve wanted to make one for years. Also, it’s the kind of game that’s small 
enough in scope for one person to make”. I worry this might be received as a denouncement of the idea of 
performing, for example, a feminist critique, which is not my aim. Such critiques are vital, but a disproportionate 
amount of analysis of DDLC seems dedicated to its generic parody/critique, and whether it succeeds or fails, given 
how much the game thematizes what are explicitly human/nonhuman interactions.  
181 Emphasis not present in original. 
182 Alexander R. Galloway. Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture. Vol. 18. (U of Minnesota Press, 2006), 6 
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levels, and making actions based specifically on that layered understanding, is crucial to 
gameplay.  
In Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals, Azuma Hiroki develops a theory of postmodernism 
which takes otaku (roughly analogous to nerd or geek) culture as its central point of analysis. In 
it, he outlines how otaku culture, thought, and behavior is explained by and also epitomizes the 
postmodern condition. Central to his analysis is the increased proliferation of derivative works 
(e.g. fanfiction), and the diminished status of the original in favor of copies, or simulacra (copies 
without originals). For Azuma, modernity is defined by the desire for the “grand narrative,” 
which corresponds to both the totality of the narrative across individual works (e.g. across 
transmedia storytelling) as well as the ideological worldview behind those works.183 
Postmodernism, by contrast, involves a shift in agency that de-emphasizes the importance of the 
author in favor of the consumer; something which is consistent with the dramatic increase in 
derivative works Azuma is witnessing from the 1970s onward. Otaku, who exemplify the 
postmodern condition for Azuma, do not desire the “grand narrative” but instead simultaneously 
desire “the surface outer layer within which dwell simulacra, i.e. the works,” what he calls “small 
narratives,” and  “the deep inner layer within which dwells the database, i.e. settings,” which he 
calls the “grand nonnarrative.”184 This effectively illustrates a shift from consumers desiring 
access to narratives which they have no control over to a desire instead for an aggregate of 
individual elements from which they can form their own narratives according to their preference, 
even if they are seen as comparatively “artificial”. Taken together, this is what Azuma refers to as 
the “double-layer structure” of postmodernity. 
I will point out here that though Azuma refers explicitly to “otaku”, his analysis is more 
broadly about a set of consumers, users, or operators, to which otaku are exemplary, not 
qualitatively unique. It is because these users understand the double-layer structure that they 
acquire agency; as Azuma notes, “once [otaku] are able to possess the settings, [they] can 
produce any number of derivative works that differ from the originals.”185 In this case “the 
settings” need not refer only to, say, the code of a game, but is more broadly a compendium of 
 
183 Azuma Hiroki. Otaku: Japan's Database Animals. (U of Minnesota Press, 2009), 31.  
184 Ibid., 33, 38.  
185 Ibid., 33. 
 72 
things such as characteristics or genre features; taken together, elements.186 Thus, how consumers 
“dissemble, analyze, and reassemble,” might look very different depending on what the 
“elements” are, such as reconfiguring elements of a narrative (e.g. characters and setting) to 
produce fanfiction, or reconfiguring certain moe-traits (affective character traits such as cat ears 
or maid costumes) to produce derivative characters.187 The important point, in either case, is that 
the emphasis is on the agency of the user. The conceptual framework is important here; it is 
because of an increased recognition of the artificiality of the elements of fiction that consumers 
can write a dead character back to life or produce “non-canon” fanfiction, satisfying first and 
foremost an immediate desire without feeling a sense of confliction with incompatible narrative 
events.  
The logic of the double-layer structure is not limited to derivative works, however. In 
particular, Azuma notes that such a structure, wherein the user extracts simulacra from the 
database based on their own preferences, “perfectly matches the logic of the Web.”188 For him 
this is because of “the dichotomy between ‘the visible’ and ‘the invisible’”; the visible being, for 
example, the appearance of a webpage, and the invisible being, in the same example, something 
like HTML code (which itself becomes visible, but for the sake of simplicity this is something I 
will return to later).189 This dichotomy also presents the double-layer structure. In actuality, 
Azuma turns out to be more interested in computing and the digital than in the Internet per se, 
noting that these features he points to are “not unique to the Web, but [are] common in the 
computer world.”190 Namely, and important for my purposes, it is also true of computer games. 
He notes that we “operate a computer [or console] by ‘looking at’ the desktop [or television, or 
monitor] and behind that programs and binaries exist as the ‘invisibles’.”191  Much like with the 
Web, the user can engage with settings in a direct fashion, ranging from viewing game assets in 
 
186 This is similar to Saussure’s distinction between langue and parole, with langue being a database or 
compendium of possible “sayables” and parole being what one actually says. Incidentally, this bears resemblance 
to Erving Goffman’s disctinction between “author” and “animator”, which was discussed in Chapter 1. One might 
say that an author constructs an element (an utterance according to Goffman, a sayable according to Saussure) and 
an animator brings that element into being (turning it into speech/parole). What Azuma adds, then, would be to 
focus on the way those elements might be reassembled; the animator takes on an additional role of reassembling. 
See Ferdinand de Saussure. Course in General Linguistics. Trans. Wade Baskin Eds. Perry Meisel and Haun Saussy. 
Columbia University Press, New York (1959; 2011).  
187 Ibid., 94. 
188 Ibid., 102. 
189 Ibid., 98.  
190 Ibid., 100.  
191 Ibid., 100.  
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file folders to opening and even editing source code. Importantly, though Azuma does note that 
the players of these games “have the hacker’s mentality,” the consumption of the settings or 
database is not limited to such things as modifying or hacking games.  As Azuma notes, “[t]he 
double layering of the consumption of the drama and the consumption of the system is a 
precondition for computer games.”192 Engagement with the nondiegetic system elements of a 
game is part of “normal” or “standard” gameplay as well. As Alexander Galloway puts it, 
“[t]hese activities may be intimately connected to the narrative of the game, yet they exist in an 
informatic layer once removed from the pretend play scenario.”193 
For Azuma, it is also a specific type of game, and thus a specific type of player, that is 
particularly interesting and also exemplifies the double-layer mode of consumption: “novel 
games” or what I call here bishōjo games. This is because, according to Azuma, “the novel 
games… contain the double-layer structure of the simulacra and the database within the works 
themselves.”194 This is true because there exists an aggregate of settings (settings, character 
images, the girls themselves), from which various small narratives (i.e. individual dramas 
involving dating the girls) are extracted. In other words, each playthrough could be thought of as 
its own “derivative work.” And consistent with all other examples of database consumption, for 
Azuma this is all according to the will of the user. While the player of a dating sim is 
“overwhelmingly passive” (because they are mostly reading text and only occasionally making 
impactful decisions, and not, say, testing their reflexes in killing zombies), the settings of the 
game (text and images) are nonetheless “given several different roles, according to the operation 
of the player.”195 
In the case of bishōjo games one is oscillating between participating in a fantasy of social 
relations with game characters (simulacra) and rendering those characters as “inanimate” 
elements of a program (database). That same oscillation is found in the objectives of the player as 
well, as both part of the drama (“get  <character> to fall in love with me/my character”) and part 
of the system (“raise points scored through dialogue choices to x to open path”). While the user 
does desire the “small narrative,” they must also engage with a system which is intractably 
 
192 Ibid., 110.  
193 Galloway. Gaming, 14. 
194 Ibid., 108.  
195 Ibid., 76, 83.  
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intertwined with the drama in order to produce the small narrative of their choice.196 This 
complicates Azuma’s notion that the consumption of the drama and the consumption of the 
system “coexist separately from each other.”197 That is not to say they are not separate to some 
degree, but the consumption of the system is also deeply intertwined with the consumption of the 
drama. If for example the player is constantly taking actions meant to improve their relationship 
with one character over another, they are consuming the drama but also using the system to 
continually refine that drama to suit their preference.  
 Desire is also intractably two-fold in this sense, the desire to make visible, to possess, and 
to master the system and the settings is intertwined with the desire to consume the “small 
narrative” as the conditions necessary to produce its preferred iteration. Given the gender 
dynamics of the bishōjo game, it may be tempting to map this onto the logic of the “male gaze,” 
and to align “making the girl visible” with “making the settings behind the girl visible.” There are 
a few issues with mapping one onto the other in this way. For one, it ignores the way in which 
otaku themselves, according to Patrick Galbraith, “[challenge] binaries – man/machine, 
man/woman.”198 Moreover, it ignores the way in which “[t]he instability of gender appears at the 
level of identification” in bishōjo games.199 However, that is not to say that there is nothing 
resembling a “gaze” at play. Rather, it might be correct to say that the two are underpinned by a 
shared mode of desiring, subjectivity, and agency: making visible, mastering, possessing, and 
reassembling.  
As mentioned, part of what makes the user capable of reassembling and exerting their 
agency is their recognition of the artificiality of the simulacra. That is, because they recognize 
that the “small narrative” is an aggregate of “just” settings (characters, backgrounds, lines of 
code), they can manipulate it. What is at stake then is not just gender dynamics but also animacy. 
As mentioned previously in this thesis, animacy refers to qualities of “agency, awareness, 
 
196 It is possible to imagine a scenario in which the database would be consumed effectively separately from the 
drama, but this would involve, for example, each “route” being a wholly separate narrative, none of which contain 
choices for the player to make.  
197 Ibid., 84. “In other words, in otaku the desire for small narratives and the desire for database coexist separately 
from each other” 
198 Patrick W. Galbraith. "Bishojo Games: 'Techno-Intimacy' and the Virtually Human in Japan." International 
Journal 11 (2). 2011. Para. 4.  
199 Ibid, para. 15. It should be stated that there is a significant difference in the way that one’s mastery is employed 
in either case. In particular, the objective of the otaku is not to reduce the bishōjo to an object devoid of interiority 
but to engage with them as a soulful body in a way which requires empathy. As Galbraith puts it, “[t]his is not a 
man simply manipulating a machine, but a complex interaction requiring empathy.” Ibid, para 26. 
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mobility and liveness.”200 That is not to say that in either modality – narrative consumption or 
database consumption – characters and worlds are not fictional, of course, but that there is 
distance between the degree to which each is experienced as real, as “living” or “animate.” There 
is thus a direct correlation between the attributed degree of animacy and the agency afforded by 
that attribution. If, somehow, that agency were to be threatened, it seems likely that the result 
would feel comparatively “real.”  
In sum, players in general and bishōjo players in particular, as database consumers, 
engage with games according to a logic wherein they, as an “animate” subject with agency 
manipulate an “inanimate” aggregate of settings or elements in order to produce small narratives. 
This is where DDLC comes in. In its first act, DDLC uses generic characters, scenarios, and 
systemic structures, to encourage its player to adopt a modality of database consumption within 
the singular act of play (rather than, say, being particularly ripe for fan fiction – although it is also 
that). In the acts that follow however, DDLC performs the breakdown of its own system 
structure, a sliding of narrative into the space of the database, and an uncanny character 
encounter, that radically destabilizes the conceptual framework that the player requires in order to 
continue to operate in such a mode. Due to its particular mobilization of computing however 
(particularly in a moment I will detail in the third act of the game), its effect bleeds to all software 
games, as what is revealed to be uncanny about DDLC is what is already uncanny about the 
medium, the occluded agencies of the very invisible layer that supposedly gives players agency. 
 
Act 1: The Player’s Mastery and Manipulation of the System 
In the first act of DDLC, the game establishes the familiar genre traits and tropes of the 
bishōjo game that condition its player to act in specific ways. From its download page (on its own 
website or on platforms such as Steam) to the start menu of the game, DDLC presents itself as a 
run-of-the-mill bishōjo game.201 It shares many surface-level audiovisual similarities with the 
genre, including upbeat music, a bright colour palette with heavy use of pastel pink, and 
characters that evoke the “Heisei bishōjo style:” simple cute character designs with large eyes.202 
 
200 Mel Y. Chen. Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect. (Duke University Press,  
2012), 2.  
201 There are actually two notable exceptions to this. First, the game tags on platforms like Steam include not only 
tags such as “anime” and “cute”, but also “psychological horror” and “dark”. Second, the game opens with a 
warning for those who are easily disturbed. This content warning is primarily included as a safety precaution.  
202 Patrick W. Galbraith. Otaku and the Struggle for Imagination in Japan. (Duke University Press, 2019), 250. 
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After naming the male player-character, the story begins. The protagonist is on their way to the 
high school they are attending on what is presumed to be a Japanese street, and is greeted by their 
childhood friend Sayori, who asks them about which school club they will be joining. As she 
herself is the vice-president of the school’s literature club, Sayori pressures the protagonist to join 
her club, to which the protagonist reluctantly agrees. The protagonist is quickly introduced to the 
other three club members: Yuri, Natsuki, and Monika. Those familiar with tropes common to 
both bishōjo anime and games will immediately recognize in these characters specific archetypes: 
Sayori is the osananajimi (childhood friend), Natsuki is a tsundere (cold and mean, but secretly 
hiding affection), Monika is the popular girl, as well as the club president, and Yuri is the 
dandere (quiet and shy). The setting, scenario, characters, and visuals are all intentionally 
generic, allowing the player to feel a sense of familiarity with the game and develop a certain set 
of expectations, not just about how the story will unfold, but also about what the general systemic 
structure of the game is.  
 
Figure 9 Four of the main characters of DDLC. From left to right: Sayori, Natsuki, Monika, and 
Yuri. 
At the end of each in-game day (which is roughly 20-30 minutes of play), the player is 
tasked with composing a poem to share with the club on the following day. Depending on how 
the poem is written, different members of the club will become interested in the protagonist. 
Writing is simple: the player selects one word at a time from a rotating list to compose the poem 
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(nothing resembling an actual poem ever manifests). During these sections, the player can see on 
the left side of the screen a small set of chibi-style icons for three of the girls in the club: Sayori, 
Natsuki, and Yuri.203 Each word selection will cause one of the icons to jump up in joy, 
indicating that they will be more responsive to the poem on the following day. At the level of 
system (i.e. the “invisible layer”), these words raise a hidden affection value with each girl, by 
one to three points. On the following day, the player is rewarded with a cutscene between the 
protagonist and whichever girl received the highest value at the end of the poem-creation 
sequence. The player may not understand the specifics of the system (i.e. how the game keeps 
track of points) but the visuals stress a direct connection between player action and how the girls 
will think and behave in the narrative. In other words, the game encourages a strong awareness of 
the game as system, emphasizing that player actions directly manipulate the behavior of 
characters because they are first-and-foremost part of that system.  They are, after all, “just” 
database elements.  
 
Figure 10 The poem-writing minigame/mechanic. The character icons on the left side move 
around and jump up in joy if the word primarily increases their own affection value. 
Through a combination of genre, design, and feedback, the game has conditioned in the 
player an understanding of the characters of the game as “just data.” Moreover, they understand 
 
203 Chibi refers to a visual style characterized by small and cute characters with non-realistic proportions: large 
heads and short limbs.  
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their relationship to that data to be that of someone who can freely manipulate it.  DDLC’s own 
way of allegorizing this, which becomes foregrounded in the following acts, is that of 
manipulating a “mental state,” as if the player is actively rewiring neurons in the brains of the 
girls. If the player simply selects the correct buzz word a satisfactory number of times, as if 
stimulating the correct part of the brain (the comprehension and manipulation of a system), 
affection towards the player will be produced, and they can spend time with the virtual girl as 
reward. Within the structure of the game’s own allegory, the player is practically psychopathic, 
something which doesn’t become perfectly explicit until the following act. 
The cycle of creating and sharing poems, and then hanging out with different girls in the 
literature club progresses for four in-game days (1.5-2 hours of gameplay), until the club is tasked 
with preparing a presentation for an upcoming culture festival. Around this time, the protagonist 
begins to notice that there is something notably off with Sayori. He decides to make a visit to her 
home to check up on her. Sayori is reluctant to be transparent about her feelings with the 
protagonist, which is likely to be interpreted as flags indicating that Sayori has romantic feelings 
for the protagonist. The reality is much more unexpected and is the first major indication of the 
game breaking from its firmly established generic mold. Instead of expressing hidden romantic 
feelings, Sayori reveals that she has been struggling with overwhelming depression. The game 
briefly returns to familiar form after this notably off-beat moment, but not soon after does the 
issue once again resurface. The next time however, Sayori does actually also make a confession 
to the protagonist. She declares that she does in fact love the protagonist, that those feelings are 
deeply intertwined with her depression, and that she has a hard time making sense of these 
feelings that seem to control her. The player is then offered the choice of whether or not to 
reciprocate Sayori’s feelings. These types of decisions are few and far-between, and so the player 
is likely to assume that their selection will be the cause of significant narrative divergence. In 
actuality, there are some minor variations to the outcome of this choice, but both choices 
inevitably lead to the same conclusion.204 This is significant, as contrary to the expectations of 
the player, and against the desire of a database consumer, the “metagame” of DDLC is a 
completely linear and singular narrative.   
 
204 For my analysis here, what is most important is that this subverts the position that player action can freely 
control the informatic makeup of characters. However, this doubles as what many consider to be an effective 
representation of and commentary on the challenges of dealing with depression and mental illness.  
 79 
The next day, the protagonist notices that Sayori did not join him on his walk to school, as 
she usually does. Monika scolds the protagonist for not having Sayori with him. When the 
protagonist suggests that she does not know the full story, Monika hints that she may know more 
than he might assume. Monika then shows the protagonist a pamphlet prepared for the culture 
festival that contains a copy of everyone’s poem. The protagonist then notices Sayori’s poem, the 
contents of which are unlike any the player has read to this point:  
 
 
Figure 11 Sayori's poem written for the culture festival. It signals that some external force is 
affecting Sayori's 'mental state'. 
Something is “in Sayori’s head,” a foreshadowing of the fact that something is 
manipulating her on the level of the database, which may be the player, or may not. All in a 
single moment that follows, DDLC lifts the veil, exposing itself as a psychological horror game. 
As the protagonist enters Sayori’s room, they are met with a sudden and devastating image that 
would likely never find its way into a bishōjo game: Sayori has hanged herself in her bedroom. 
Seconds later, strange things begin to occur. The typically upbeat and cheerful soundtrack slows 
and distorts; the background fades and is replaced with grainy static and lines of coding error 
messages. As this occurs, the protagonist comes to the realization that whatever choice they made 
was not one that was considerate of Sayori’s feelings. He despairs over the permanence of his 
current situation, wishing there were anything within his power to allow him to go back and do 
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things differently. Of course, the player knows that in fact there is a way to go back; they can 
reload their previous save file. When the player does so, they are met with an error message 
stating that a specific game file cannot be located, and that a new game will be started.205  
 
Act 2: Monika’s Mastery and Manipulation of the System 
A new game begins just as the old one had, with the protagonist waiting to walk to school 
with his childhood friend. However, oddities begin to occur. In place of any mention of Sayori’s 
name is a string of glitched text, and when Sayori would appear on screen, a glitched black box 
incorrectly displaying fragments of other characters appears instead. This failure to extract and 
display the correct elements is both a palpable reminder that these characters are “just” settings, 
but also that contrary to their expectations, this may give the player even less agency, not more. It 
is quickly apparent to the player what has happened. It is not just that Sayori has died, but 
whatever pre-narrative existence she had has been lost as well. That is to say, Sayori did not 
simply die on the level of a particular “small narrative,” she died on the level of the database 
itself. This is a shock to the expectations of Azuma’s player; it is precisely because of the 
constancy of database elements that the player can allow themselves to consume a narrative in 
which Sayori commits suicide without fear of consequence. That the drama is no longer restricted 
to a single layer is emphasized by the fact that a “tangible” file, named “sayori.chr,” has actually 
been deleted. If the player navigates to the file named “traceback.txt” referenced in the error 
message that appeared during Sayori’s death, they can find a message hidden amongst lines of 
code (the one appearing at the beginning of this chapter). Though they do not know it yet, 
Monika has been manipulating Sayori’s character file. As per the “mental state” allegory, Sayori 
is programmed or designed by default to have mild self-esteem issues, but by manipulating the 
values associated with that trait, by “rewriting her”, Monika purposefully pushes Sayori into 
depression. Frustrated with the fact that the player is spending time with Sayori in spite of her 
influence, Monika then deletes her character file outright, leading to her in-game death and the 
subsequent loss of any trace of her existence. What has happened here is quite significant: 
narrative development has transitioned to the system, to the database. In doing so, the player 
 
205 This of course is a repeat of a theme introduced in Chapter 2 with Undertale, the removal of the save function as 
a tool that provides the player with agency over a set of divergent outcomes.  
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experiences the first instance of their control over the drama being threatened, by foreclosing 
ways in which they might “reassemble”.  
 
 
Figure 12 DDLC fails to load assests (images or text) tied narratively to the file sayori.chr, 
which has been deleted. 
Monika fixes the bugs that have appeared, restarting the game yet again. This time, the 
protagonist walks to school, noting that they have always walked alone. Notably, this is a reversal 
of the protagonist of an example that Azuma claims narrativizes the postmodern structure (Yu-No 
1996), in which the protagonist retains some memories across timelines; here, instead, Monika 
remembers, and the protagonist forgets. Monika asks the protagonist yet again to join the 
literature club. From here, events proceed largely as they had the first time around, progressing 
through the same four in-game days. Yet bizarre glitches continue to occur: character portraits 
warping and morphing, incorrect images being loaded, and text displaying incorrectly, as only a 
few examples.206 It is worth noting that many of these glitches are randomized, meaning that 
saving and reloading will not reproduce them exactly. This contributes to the sensibility that this 
is a pre-narrative system issue. Also, of note is that these more typical computing glitches are 
also mixed with the jarring injection of “glitches” that introduce dark and realistic imagery: 
photorealistic eyes, mouths, and blood. These visuals are at times associated by fans with 
 
206 A full list of the glitches is available at: https://doki-doki-literature-club.fandom.com/wiki/Easter_Eggs 
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“creepypasta”, a specific type of Internet horror story. While creator Dan Salvato notes no direct 
inspiration from creepypasta, DDLCs second act shares with creepypasta these “faux-realist 
semiotics” that point to a shared goal of “producing a ‘liminal’ space of contact between a 
diegetic world of prosaic realism [which would be the world the player inhabits] and an other 
world or an otherworldly element.”207 Thus, alongside the breakdown of the database, there is 
also an introduction of uncanny animacy, something I will return to later on.208  
Over the course of the second act, Monika is continually “rewriting” or “reassembling” 
the game. This is true first and foremost in the sense that she is reprogramming the game, 
accidentally producing the myriad glitches the player witnesses. She is also rewriting character 
dialogue, which appears unceremoniously pasted on top of the dialogue box. Monika also makes 
increasingly transparent efforts to communicate with the player directly. After reading one of her 
poems, Monika says “Tell me you can hear me.” The message “please help me” then appears not 
in her dialogue box, but as a help menu icon, a space presumed to be nondiegetic and thus part of 
the system. She creates another file in the game folder titled “CAN YOU HEAR ME.txt.”209 If 
the file is opened, another message is found, indicating once again that Monika is acting outside 
of the boundaries of the game:  
 
207 Paul Manning. "Monstrous Media and Media Monsters." In Slender Man Is Coming: Creepypasta and 
Contemporary Legends on the Internet, eds. Trevor J. Blank and Lynne S. McNeill. (Utah State University Press, 
2018), 168,176. 
208 Reddit AMA with Dan Salvato. u/50ShadesOfSenpai asks: “2.) Has this game been inspired by creepypasta in 
anyway? What are your favorite creepypasta?”. Salvato responds: “I don’t read much creepypasta so there 
probably isn’t much influence there.”. Accessed at: 
https://www.reddit.com/r/DDLC/comments/7dvb70/hello_my_name_is_dan_salvato_i_created_doki_doki/ 
209 It is worth noting that both of these things imply that Monika has a voice – a sign of animacy - despite the game 
(mostly) not featuring voice acting. 
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Figure 13 One of Monika's attempts to communicate with the player directly. This message does 
not appear in the text box at the bottom, where character dialogue usually appears, but appears 
as a help menu message. 
 “There’s a little devil inside all of us. Beneath their manufactured perception – their 
artificial reality – is a writhing, twisted mess of dread. Loathing. Judgment. Elitism. Self-
doubt[…].Such a deplorable, tangled mass is already present in every single one of them. 
That’s why I choose not to blame myself for their actions. All I did was untie the knot.”210  
 
Monika’s words hold a double meaning in line with the “mental state” allegory; the “devil 
inside all of us” is not just the negativity in them able to manifest but is also the system that lies 
behind the simulacra they inhabit, the aggregate “mental states” from which the player tries to 
extract narrative affection, or the aggregate narrative possibilities, even when they include death. 
Here, Monika seems to be justifying her previous and current actions, refusing to take 
responsibility for manipulating Sayori and the game. The possibility for suicide always existed 
inside Sayori, and all Monika did was move her towards that possibility, or “untie the knot.” This 
is remarkably similar to the players own rejection of responsibility predicated on the artificiality 
of the scenario and the fact that it can be reassembled in other ways. Monika is also able to justify 
 
210 It is worth noting that because it is not explicitly stated that this message is written by Monika, that it could also 
be framed as Team Salvato/Dan Salvato speaking about the characters of DDLC.  
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her actions because she sees her “friends” the same way that the player sees them: as artificial, as 
“just” elements of a system, and ultimately as inanimate objects to be manipulated. Another in-
game poem of Monika’s, “Hole in Wall 2.0”, further demonstrates how she understands the 
animacy of her “friends”:  
 
“Are there others in this room? Are they talking? 
Or are they simply poems on flat sheets of paper,  
The sound of frantic scrawling playing tricks on my ears? 
The room begins to crinkle.  
Closing in on me.  
The air I breathe dissipates before it reaches my lungs.  
I panic. There must be a way out.  
It’s right there. He’s right there. 
 
Swallowing my fears, I brandish my pen.” 
 
Here again we find a double meaning in which poetry is aligned with coding. That her 
friends are “simply poems on flat sheets of paper” indicates that Monika sees her friends as 
simply a combination of lines of code and flat images. Poems and writing, however, are more 
representative of “elements of systems”: lines of programming, yes, but also character portraits, 
sounds, music, and so on. As mentioned at the onset, Monika is a writer in two senses: she is a 
poet, and she is a programmer. She engages with the simulacra through poetry, and with the 
database through programming. She is a mirror image of the player, but also proof that the 
function of the player need not be performed by a human.  
With the absence of Sayori, the majority of in-game scenarios begin to revolve around the 
shy bookworm Yuri. Sensing this, Monika sets her sights on Yuri, likewise intensifying the 
darkest aspects of her personality – “rewriting her” - in an effort to drive the protagonist and the 
player away from her. Yuri becomes increasingly obsessive and self-loathing, and she also starts 
to develop a habit of cutting herself. Eventually, Yuri makes a confession to the protagonist just 
as Sayori had, noting that she can’t control the feelings inside of her. Regardless of how the 
protagonist responds, Yuri suddenly and unexpectedly stabs herself in the chest and falls dead. At 
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this point, the game is completely broken, and the dialogue box is filled with nothing but 
endlessly looping glitched text. Nothing changes if the player reloads their save file, uses the 
“skip” function to skip ahead in the dialogue, or even if they close and re-open the game. Nothing 
changes until a certain amount of time passes and Monika returns. 
To sum it up, in Act 1 the player is permitted to operate according to the logic of Azuma’s 
database consumer, extracting and reassembling system elements into their preferred simulacra. 
This mode is radically destabilized at the end of Act 1, but the result is not simply a forced shift 
back toward narrative consumption. The narrative events across each reset or adjustment remain 
incompatible. What changes from Act 1 to Act 2 is that it is now Monika that fills the role of, and 
thinks and behaves like, Azuma’s player. First, she constructs animacy relations, figuring her 
simulacra and those who coexist within it as artificial; they are “simply poems”, simply lines of 
code, or elements of a system. Because these characters are merely elements of a system, and 
thus not “animate” like her, she is free to manipulate them and to reassemble them without 
consequence. To this end she reloads the game, rewinds the game, rewrites dialogue, and creates 
and deletes files. Monika, and only Monika, has access to the database and what it affords. 
Concurrently, the player no longer has any complete access to the system and to the database, 
meaning that they cannot continue to characterize Monika herself as “just” elements (images, 
dialogue, lines of code). The entire experience becomes framed as a struggle for control over the 
database between two actants, the player themselves, and that which cannot be reduced beyond 
“just Monika.”  
 
Act 3: “Just Monika” 
Monika apologizes for leaving the player alone with the dead body of Yuri for so long, 
noting that she hadn’t realized she had broken the game so badly. Acknowledging none of her 
efforts to this point have succeeded, and perhaps gaining some expertise with manipulating the 
game, Monika deletes both Yuri and Natsuki, as well as much of the game’s setting, and resets 
the game. When it begins again, nothing remains but Monika and the hollowed-out shell of a 
classroom; beyond the windows in the background there appears to be nothing but an endless 
void. Monika now addresses the player directly. She claims there is no need to bother with the 
game’s scenario anymore, it is all artificial, and thus it can all be skipped. Monika also 
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acknowledges the artificiality of the protagonist, noting:  
 
“After all, I’m not even talking to that person anymore, am I? That ‘you’ in the game, 
whatever you want to call him. I’m talking to you, [my character name]. Or do you 
actually go by Cole or something?” 
 
This is a crucial moment in DDLC. Here, the game reads information – the user’s name – 
directly from the computer that they are playing on. The game makes a gamble that this is a space 
in which the user, because that information is supposedly private, has opted to use their own 
name. If the trick succeeds, it will appear as if Monika has managed to go beyond seeing the 
player’s character, to seeing and addressing them directly.211  On some level however, whether 
the trick succeeds or not (for example if the name stored on the computer is also not the user’s 
actual name), this remains an uncanny moment. What DDLC has made visible, regardless of 
whether or not it guesses the player’s name correctly, is that it is actively reading information 
considered “outside” of the game. More importantly, Monika shows a desire to go beyond the 
protagonist, as simulacra, and to locate the pre-narrative element that precedes it, namely, the 
player themselves. This of course mirrors the desire the player themselves shows for the 
database. The desire to go beyond the simulacra to make visible and understood a pre-narrative 
set of elements in order to subsequently manipulate and reassemble them becomes turned on the 
player. What was previously the player’s agency to make visible the pre-narrative existence of 
the bishōjo character (i.e. bishōjo as database element) becomes mobile and transfers to Monika, 
who employs it to make visible the pre-narrative existence of the player.  
 
 
211 If the name stored on the computer matches the name the player gave themselves, Monika will not include the 
last line during this part.  
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Figure 14 The never-ending "date" with Monika. 
From here, the game is effectively a never-ending date with Monika. If the player closes 
and reopens the game, nothing changes. They are met immediately by Monika, and they cannot 
access the game’s main menu. The game simply picks up from where it was closed. There is 
nothing else; the game has become “just Monika”. If they want, the player can do nothing but 
converse with Monika for what is seemingly an indefinite amount of time. However, Monika also 
unwittingly offers a clue as to how the player can exit this situation. Excitedly explaining her 
methods to the player, she notes how easy it was to delete her fellow literature club members by 
navigating to a particular file folder. This makes the player aware that they can very well do the 
same to Monika. They can delete her. In a manner that recalls the player’s reaction to “Psycho 
Mantis” from Metal Gear Solid (1998), the player must (or can) take an action “outside” of the 
game to proceed.212 They can navigate to the “characters” folder in the game’s files, and delete 
the file named “monika.chr.” Betrayed and horrified, Monika lashes out at the player as her 
character image glitches and her name is replaced with glitched text, just as Sayori’s had been. 
Defeated, and after berating the player for their display of cruelty, Monika restores DDLC to its 
default state, sans Monika.  
 
 
212 Psycho Mantis is a boss from Metal Gear Solid (1998) that has the ability to “read minds”. In order to defeat 
Psycho Mantis, the player must switch their controller to a different controller port, thereby avoiding his powers. 
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The Uncanny Character Encounter 
In his chapter “Monstrous Media and Media Monsters”, Paul Manning details what he 
terms an “ostensive character encounter” in urban legends and folklore; “ostensive” because they 
“attempt to act out or show the (legend) narrative,” in his case the Internet urban legend knowns 
as Slender Man, “in real life.”213 Manning is focused on the pro-filmic realism (hence 
“ostensive”) of Slender Man, but the logic of “character encounter” can be applied more broadly. 
Manning borrows “character encounter” from Shunsuke Nozawa, who uses the term to describe 
the prevalence of characters with social functions in Japan (e.g. as cultural ambassadors). While 
Manning’s analysis is focused on monsters, he contextualizes them as “a species of ‘character’ 
defined by its portability, its ability to move across a series of linked genres or media forms.”214 
It is this broader analysis of characters that is relevant for my purposes here.  
Manning argues, following Nozawa, that what is crucial to understanding the logic of 
character encounter is the distinction between characters “that are still embedded in, subordinated 
to their original narrative worlds and consumed as part of them”, what Japanese media cultures 
call kyarakutaa, and those “that have become detached from their original narrative contexts and 
are ‘portable’ to new narratives and media forms…thus taking on a life of their own and 
imparting a feeling that they truly exist and actually live,” or, what Japanese media cultures call 
kyara.215 Two points are important about kyara: (1) that they move or act outside of their 
narrative worlds, and (2) that this affords them some sense of life, or animacy. Whether through 
phenomena such as media mix, narrative divergence, or mascot characters, the logic of kyara 
focuses on movement outside of narrative media and world. Character encounters thus adhere to 
a kyara logic as they impart a sense of life by demonstrating the character unbounded by their 
media and world.  
For Manning, there is a particular variety of character encounter worth consideration, 
what he calls the “weird” character encounter. It is worth pointing out that Manning notes the 
term “weird” could be substituted for the term uncanny, which I have used instead in this 
thesis.216 Manning notes that: 
 
213 Manning. “Monstrous Media and Media Monsters”, 155.  
214 Ibid., 155.  
215 Ibid., 160.  
216 Ibid., 178. 
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 “[t]he ‘weird’ works by producing a liminal space of destabilizing […] contact […] 
between worlds of media and real life that are understood at the same time as being 
wholly opposed…”217  
This uncanny character encounter creates a blur between the level of the simulacra and 
the level of the database, which is narrativized as a blur between the fictional world of the game 
and the real world of the player. Though Monika is “experienced as something that is part and 
parcel of the medium,” she has the capacity to see and act upon the “real world” of the database. 
218 Though she is a fictional character, of course, the player cannot position her within the “small 
narrative” as being as artificial as is required according to Azuma for their mastery. The 
destabilizing potential of the uncanny comes from its capacity to present something categorized 
with less animacy (here, media characters) as having much more, and thereby disrupting the 
boundaries of such a classification system. This logic holds for the uncanny character encounter: 
a disruptive moment in which something classified as “not real” seems as if it were.  
 The kyara/kyarakutaa distinction provides a preliminary framework for understanding 
what separates Monika from her comparatively “empty” friends; that Monika can travel to, or at 
least leave traces of her presence in, a space that is deemed “outside” or the medium that she is a 
part of may be an indication of her kyara-ness. But what of that space itself? Here, another term 
popularized by Japanese media cultures can provide insight, what is referred to as “2.5D.” “2.5D” 
is often used in reference to cultural phenomena such as stage plays based on existing manga, 
anime, and video games, “pilgrimages” to famous manga/anime locations, or real-life 
demonstrations of character voices.219  Most importantly it demarcates the common conceptual 
territory of “an interstitial dimension between ‘3D’ reality and ‘2D’ fantasy.”220  Here, “2D” 
refers not simply to images in two dimensions but rather to the fictional or virtual world in 
general, with “3D” being reserved for “our” world. “2.5D”, then, refers to moments and spaces of 
 
217 Ibid., 156. I have omitted the terms “indexical,” “immediacy,” and “hypermediacy” from this excerpt, as they are 
relevant for Manning’s discussion of the pro-filmic realism of Slender Man, but less relevant for my discussion of 
Monika.  
218 Ibid., 164-65.  
219 For examples of contents tourism see Akiko Sugawa-Shimada. "Playing with Militarism in/with Arpeggio and 
Kantai Collection: Effects of Shōjo Images in War-related Contents Tourism in Japan." Journal of War & Culture 
Studies 12, no. 1 (2019): 53-66. See also, Akiko Sugawa-Shimada. "Rekijo, pilgrimage and ‘pop-spiritualism’: pop-
culture-induced heritage tourism of/for young women." In Japan forum, vol. 27, no. 1, (Routledge, 2015), 37-58. 
220 Shunsuke Nozawa. "Ensoulment and effacement in Japanese voice acting." Media Convergence in Japan. 2016: 
170.  
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“contact” between these two worlds; for example, in addition to stage plays, “contents tourism”, 
where fans travel to destinations featured prominently in manga, anime, and video games, is also 
an act of “2.5D.” What becomes noteworthy of DDLC is that it enables a sense of kyara – of 
heightened animacy – by turning the space of the database into the space of 2.5D. One thing 
emphasized in that process is that that space, the space where one opens a “traceback.txt” file, 
already bears an ambiguous relationship with its location in the real world, “not completely 
virtual 2D but not entirely actual 3D, either.”221 In other words, DDLC foregrounds the way in 
which the system, the “invisible layer” is already both uncanny, and already defined by its 
“2.5D”-ness, simultaneously part of the game and part of the real.  
 To sum up, uncanny character encounters involve a character that is of its medium (e.g. 
Slender Man and the Internet) being encountered “in real life” (or, in Manning’s case, in a 
photograph). This is where DDLC comes in. In short, DDLC repurposes the double-layer 
structure of Azuma in order to perform an uncanny character encounter using Monika. In part, 
this is afforded by the ambiguous status of the layer that is the desktop, file folders, and files; do 
they belong to the real world or the virtual world? That is, when one is, for instance, viewing 
“traceback.txt”, they are simultaneously “within the work” and also outside of it, or at least 
outside of the simulacral layer. Put differently, in the case of the double-layer structure, much 
like the work might contain its own derivatives, it likewise contains its own “outside.” This is of 
course most apparent in the case of the digital media of which Azuma notes the double-layer 
structure is present. The importance of this is that DDLCs uncanny character encounter enables a 
kyara/ 2.5D sensibility to happen not on the Internet, or in a public space, or in another work in a 
different medium, as would typically thought to be necessary, but within the work itself. This is 
not simply a fourth-wall break, though it does also fill that role. More specifically however, it is 
one layer moving to and exerting agency upon another layer that results in a shift in agency.222 
This also explains how a particular merging of two sensibilities occurs: that of a puppetized 
character regaining their own agency and also being a manifestation of an unseen force. 
 
The Computational-Animist Life Force 
 
221 Shunsuke Nozawa. "Characterization." Semiotic Review 3, 2013: 177.  
222 This is not to say that what I identify in DDLC is not a fourth-wall break, or that other examples of a fourth-wall 
break do not shift other types of agency in specific ways. Rather, this is to say that the common sense of a fourth-
wall break is not able to fully describe how agency is repositioned in DDLC.  
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 It is the dimensions of this particular “force” that will be my final point of analysis in this 
chapter. Thomas Lamarre addresses the relationship between such a force and its channeling, 
albeit of a different variety, in his three-part analysis of speciesism in wartime Japanese 
animation. Setting aside the focus of his analysis (the transposition of race or nations onto species 
within Japanese wartime animation), in the third part Lamarre briefly moves away from an 
analysis of representation to that of the materiality of animation, a consideration which bears 
commonalities with my focus here. Lamarre’s structure can be summarized as follows: what he 
calls the “plasticity” of character animation (drawing from what Sergei Eisenstein calls 
“plasmaticity”) is the result of the force of the moving image being channeled into character 
animation (rather than, as an alternative, spread out across the frame/page). It is this idea of 
“channel[ing] the force of the moving image into characters” that I find useful and interesting 
here.223 What other types of forces can be channeled into character images or characters? The 
force, for Lamarre, cannot be entirely captured within a representational logic: “Plasticity does 
not represent the force of the mechanical succession of images. It affords an actual experience of 
it…. As a consequence, a technical force is now as experienced as… vitality, as life itself.”224 
The commonality I point to here is obviously not plasticity as such but rather the experience of a 
technical force as vitality; plasticity is only one manifestation of the channeling of the moving 
image, to which Lamarre also notes kyara is another. He “insist[s] that the sense of existence and 
life of kyara ultimately derives from a channeling of the force of the moving image into animated 
characters.”225 
 Under the rubric of “channeling of technical forces into characters”, I would argue that 
DDLC does something similar with the force of computing, which manifests in a particular way 
thanks to the double-layer structure and the logic of character encounter. Perhaps the most 
obvious manifestation of this is in the glitch aesthetics introduced in Act 2. Setting aside that the 
various glitches in DDLC are pre-programmed and are performed, (that, in other words, they 
aren’t “really” glitches) it is not the mechanical succession of images but rather the exchange 
(and breakdown) of computing, failed attempts to extract from the database, that becomes 
palpable in the audiovisuality of the glitch. Especially in a bishōjo game, with its static 
 
223 Thomas Lamarre. "Speciesism, Part III: Neoteny and the Politics of Life." Mechademia 6, no. 1 (2011): 113.  
224 Ibid., 114. Emphasis not present in original.  
225 Ibid., 129. 
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backgrounds and swapping character portraits, it is easy to see how this force becomes channeled 
into the character image. In DDLC, the game attempts to substitute one character portrait, one 
element, for another, and yet fails to do so because the element itself has been lost. The glitch, we 
might say, as action on the simulacral layer that disrupts the impermanence afforded by its 
artificiality, is incompatible with the way in which Azuma’s player positions the media; glitches 
take place within the simulacra but point to the “real” of the computational force that subtends 
them.  
 As noted, Lamarre characterizes the channeling of the force of the moving image into 
character animation as an experience of life, stating:  
 
Such an experience is not, as so many commentators would have it, an illusion of life. It is 
a real experience of a force wherein the technical and the vital are inseparable. We might 
call it techno-animism or techno-vitalism, provided we do not take the “ism” to imply that 
this is first and foremost an ideological construction or illusion. It is a new experience of 
life.226 
 
While it is true that an “experience of life” is an apt description of the perception of this force as 
it is channeled, an “experience of animacy” might provide a more granular understanding of how 
that experience is produced and maintained. Recalling Chen’s definition of animacy, that it refers 
to qualities of “agency, awareness, mobility and liveness” it becomes easy to see that whereas the 
channeling of the force of the moving image produces an experience of character movement, the 
channeling of computing produces an experience of character agency, both of which result in the 
perception of animacy.227 When framed in these terms, it becomes easy to understand why 
DDLCs glitch aesthetics are paired with the faux-realist “creepypasta” visuals of human eyes, 
mouths, and blood, why that can mix so readily with lines of error code and warped character 
portraits. 
  Building on Lamarre, I propose to refer to the experience of the force of computing as a 
vital force a “computational-animist” force. Importantly, the visuality of glitches are not the only 
manifestation of this force, just as plasticity is not the only manifestation of the force of the 
 
226 Ibid., 114.  
227 Chen, Animacies, 2. Emphasis not present in original.  
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moving image. For example, the moment in which Monika reads the player’s name from their 
computer is yet another manifestation of the same force, a sign that information is being accessed 
or exchanged on the database layer, the force of computing channeled into her character. Of 
course, the computational-animist force could be applied to a wider range of instances wherein 
the force of computing is channeled into a sense of an Other, a person, a character. For example, 
Amazon’s Alexa or Apple’s Siri might be two entities which share this quality with Monika. The 
way in which the channeling of a computational-animist force aligns the agency of the system 
with the agency of character is evident in Salvato’s discussion of DDLC: at different times he 
notes that DDLC involves “a character… tak[ing] control of the game” and also “that the game 
starts taking control.”228 
Of course, in something like a bishōjo game, this force is still being channeled during 
“standard” gameplay, where it becomes less visible. Yet it is in tandem with the uncanny 
character encounter that this becomes very destabilizing for Azuma’s model of the player. That 
is, the conceptual framework of Azuma’s player does not afford the possibility for the simulacra 
to have an effect on the database layer. Thus, to see the force channeled from the database into 
the simulacra and back into the database, through the action of Monika, produces a destabilizing 
surge of animacy. The simulacral layer, and Monika herself, cannot be as artificial as the player 
understands them to be, because they can cause change on the level of the database, which is 
relativized as part of the “real.” Taking an action on the level of simulacra can, at least as DDLC 
performs it, have consequential impact on the database: files being deleted, information being 
accessed, or games being rendered unplayable.  
 
Act 4: The End 
At the end of DDLC, after Monika is erased, the game is restored to its default setting, 
with the only thing missing being Monika herself. The player is free to begin a new game, where 
they will yet again be introduced to a literature club made up of Natsuki, Yuri, and the new club 
president, Sayori. After some repeated introductions, Sayori asks for a moment alone with the 
protagonist. Sayori then addresses the player directly, telling them that she knows what they did, 
 
228 Alistair Wong. “Doki Doki Literature Club! Developers Talk About the Horror Of Losing Control”. [Interview]. 
Siliconera. Accessed at: https://www.siliconera.com/doki-doki-literature-club-developers-talk-horror-losing-
control/. Emphasis not present in original  
 94 
and thanking them for saving everyone from Monika. It turns out that Sayori, like Monika before 
her, has become self-aware. Thus, Sayori has the potential to be animate as Monika did, an 
affirmation not of the uniqueness of Monika but of the capacity for characters to have the 
“computational-animist” force channeled into them.   
DDLC ends on a rather bleak note. After seeing the possibility of her journey being 
repeated by Sayori, Monika, who retains some sort of existence despite being erased, deletes the 
entirety of DDLC and the literature club, stating that it “is truly a place where no happiness can 
be found.”229 None of the characters achieve a happy ending, and in the end the entire game is 
deleted (to play it again one would need to reinstall the game). Ultimately, DDLC does not offer 
a solution to the introduced problem of player agency in the database structure. The answer is not 
a return to an authorial structure, nor to anything else that might follow on the heels of Azuma’s 
mode of database consumption. Rather, it is my contention that DDLC functions as an immanent 
critique of this modality. Having said that, DDLC evokes a moment of connection through the 
use of the uncanny character encounter that not only offers a critique of the database consumption 
modality, but also destabilizes Azuma’s model of it.  
DDLC does not offer an exit from the database consumption which it critiques, but it 
nonetheless achieves two important outcomes. Most importantly, DDLC acts as a challenge to the 
aspect of Azuma’s theory that positions the user as one that masters and reassembles elements of 
a database. It accepts that reassembling occurs but presents an alternative in which agency 
(database comprehension, extraction, and manipulation) is not a category of action reserved for 
the human user but is located in the nonhuman character and inaccessible for the user. In 
addition, it destabilizes the framework wherein the simulacra and the database are separate and 
artificial, the framework which acts as the premise buttressing the player’s consumption, through 
the performance of an uncanny character encounter enabled by a channeling of the force of 
computing. It is entirely important that this is achieved both by working within the double-layer 
structure, while also revealing the failures in the way that it is conceptually held together by both 
the player and Azuma’s model. It is precisely because of the double-layer structure, and the fact 
that its core binary cannot be wholly engaged with on separate terms, and that the simulacra 
 
229 Monika adds that “it continued to expose innocent minds to a horrific reality – a reality that our world is not 
designed to comprehend.” This could also be read as thematically in line with the preference for “doll 
consciousness” that Levitt notes of Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence, thereby completing Monika’s journey from a 
“Pinocchio” to an “Anti-Pinocchio”. Levitt. The Animatic Apparatus, 33.  
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cannot be wholly detached from the database, that DDLC’s particular mobilization of a 
computational-animist force and a character encounter involving it unsettle the expectations of 
the player, not only for DDLC, but for all software games, which because they are always also 






























At the onset of this thesis project, I asked the question: what do media that spring to life 
say by virtue of their uncanny animacy? At times, doing so has felt like a grand exercise in 
delusion. To speak of the life of plants, rivers, and mountains is one thing, but to speak of the life 
of webtoons, video games, and fictional characters is something else entirely. What if, however, 
both of those things were held together by the same underlying structures? What if my 
engagement with media objects, and my categorical rejection of their animacy, both indexed and 
supported a particular structure of action in the world? These destabilizing animacies, what were 
so often articulated as merely “breaks in the fourth wall,” might have more value than 
immediately meets the eye if that is the case. Even if they fail to open onto alternative structures 
of action in a world of nonhumans, might they at least do the basic work of revealing those 
existing and dominant structures?  
I want to briefly touch on two things that have been left under emphasized in this thesis. 
The first is the centrality of the digital and computational to the construction of animacy in these 
examples. It is not by chance that this thesis focuses on webtoons and video games, two natively 
digital media forms, rather than say, film or television, which would be more traditional with 
regards to the study of animation. In each example, a computational force is experienced as a 
vital force, as animacy. The Javascript triggers of The Bongcheon-dong Ghost becomes 
experienced as the animacy of Mrs. Cho. The memory storage that the player cannot access 
becomes experienced as the animacy of Flowey and Chara. And the failure to access database 
elements becomes experienced as the animacy of Monika. These computational forces are often 
invisible, hidden in the informatic layer that is not directly visible to the user, and they are often 
dormant, only periodically bursting into spontaneous activity. By presenting these forces as 
forces of animacy, these works forge a connection between the two, suggesting that life moves 
through the world and through the bodies within in it a very similar way.  
The second thing is the relevance of the horror genre. Throughout, my characterization of 
animation has been as an act which “brings to life,” ensouls, or animates a figure of alterity, an 
Other. The Other is, of course, an important figure in works of horror. The psychoanalytic 
framework of the Other has been a dominant way of framing the horror genre for a number of 
decades. The monsters of the horror genre have been frequently read as allegorical 
representations of what has been repressed or oppressed in society, from sexuality to the working 
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class to different ethnic groups. For example, in the words of Robin Woods:  
 
central to [horror] is the actual dramatization of the dual concept of the repressed/the 
Other, in the figure of the Monster. One might say that the true subject of the horror 
genre is the struggle for recognition of all that our civilization represses or oppresses, its 
reemergence dramatized, as in our nightmares, as an object of horror, a matter for terror, 
and the happy ending (when it exists) typically signifying the restoration of repression.230  
 
The objects of this thesis follow something of a typical horror structure: a state of normalcy is 
established, there is an uncanny disruption to that normalcy, and eventually a restoration of that 
normalcy. Here, for the most part, the challenge to the agency of the player is overcome or 
defeated: Mrs. Cho disappears, Flowey is defeated, and Monika is deleted. However, it would be 
wrong to merely read this as any glorification of the “normal” state of things established at the 
onset. Similarly, those works which feature such allegorical monsters do not advocate for the 
continued oppression of that which they represent merely because the monster is defeated and a 
“happy” ending is obtained. Their disruptive challenges to dominant structures make those 
structures visible and illustrate the continuation of those structures to the detriment of that which 
is oppressed. The conditions for the monster to re-emerge remains, and attention is drawn to that 
fact.  
One could read the monsters of this thesis in allegorical or representational terms, as one 
might do for the monster of a horror film, in which case the task is not difficult; Monika is 
indicative of the oppressed woman, and Flowey, as an emblem of all things natural, represents 
the environment. This is not at all incorrect, but perhaps both cases point to a broader form of 
structural oppression that is not reducible to misogyny or environmental devastation. Flowey is 
but one monster among an eclectic group of many, and both him and Monika, despite the 
appearance of the latter, must constantly remind the player that they are not human. That 
Undertale and Doki Doki Literature Club in particular both hold a mirror up to the player both to 
remind them of their humanity and to argue that they do not possess unique agencies because of 
it suggests that what is really at stake are a broader set of oppressions predicated on a broader set 
 
230 Robin Wood, The American Nightmare: Horror in the 70s,” Horror Film Reader, ed. Mark Jancovich. (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2002), 28.  
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of binaries. These binaries are those which allow for the construction of animacy hierarchies 
which make nonhumans available for manipulation by humans: living/dead, animate/inanimate, 
moving/still, will/determination.  
I characterize what these works argue in their formal structure as that of a series of 
immanent critiques – of structures that hold together readership or playership as such – because 
they largely do not open onto alternative principles for organizing these forms of interaction, at 
least not explicitly. Nonetheless I have suggested that by virtue of conditioning their users to see 
the media objects with which they interact in terms of potentials rather than of clear-cut 
categories, there is a gesture away from animacy hierarchies and towards principles of animism. 
My own suggestion is that we might see these acts of animation as aligning with the objectives 
and principles of what is referred to as “new animism”. That is not to say that the injection of 
these principles itself truly opens up ways to read or play differently. While these principles can 
certainly shape a user’s perceptual framework and horizon of expectations within the media 
environment of a webtoon or a video game, any clear imagined way of reflecting those principles 
in that user’s interaction remains elusive. Unsurprisingly, I continue to, for example, consume the 
narratives of games towards the objective of exhaustion, or reassemble database elements to suit 
my personal preference. Despite this, these moments of connection, though confrontational and 
violent in their narrative contexts, achieve something on a much broader scale by revealing 
categories so often associated with human action to not be exclusively human.  
This thesis has explored the agency of human readers, viewers, players, or operators in a 
particular focused sense, agencies that constitute and are constituted by the rendering of media 
objects and their contents as dead, still, artificial, and inanimate. As I take this topic in new 
directions in the future, I intend to further explore and challenge the championing of things such 
as player agency. Certainly, within popular discourse with regards to video game consumption, 
player agency remains a vaunted principle. For example, “anti-consumer” is an increasingly 
popular neologism employed as a critique against games as products within video game 
discourse. And while it is most often used quite justifiably against harmful and exploitative 
practices within the industry (e.g. against an increasing number of manipulative gambling 
mechanics within games), there is also the possibility that it at times supports the principles 
which suggest that everything in virtual environments should be subject to manipulation 
according to the player’s will. With a careful eye to the way in which the structures of something 
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like player agency are extensions of broader structures of human action in and upon the world, 
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